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ABSTRACT 
MARY FRANCES HOLLAND  
Institutional Divides: How Democracy Affects Economic Complexity In the Transition 
Economies Eastern Europe And Central Asia 
(Under the direction of Dr. Joshua First)  
 
The transition economies, in making their way from a command economy to an 
integrated market economy, experience vastly different levels of development. This work 
proposes an influence of inclusive, democratic institutions on increased economic 
complexity. This project reviews the history of diverging political and economic policy 
decisions across the region. Case studies for Poland, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan review 
trade data and democratic policies to better understand groups of development across the 
region. This paper utilizes Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s institutional-
developmental theory as a basis for the creation and sustainability of democratic and 
economically diverse structures. 
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Introduction 
The years 1989 to 1991 catapulted a vast region of economically, politically, and 
culturally diverse countries into a new, globalizing and market-oriented world. Twenty-
five countries1 , located across two continents, were forced to find new ways both to 
relate to the rest of the world and, perhaps most importantly, understand and build new 
national identities, along with the institutions to support them. This project addresses how 
these variations in transition have created different economic environments with different 
levels of economic output. To do this, this study observes the connection between the 
level of democracy and the economic complexity index score, an evaluation of the 
strength of an economy based on trade data. Globally, there is a positive correlation 
between increased levels of democracy and increased economic complexity ratings, 
which categorize economic performance through the movement and ubiquity of goods. 
Unsurprisingly, the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are less democratic and 
less economically diversified than their Western neighbors of the European Union. This 
research looks into the connections between democracy and economics and hopes to find 
whether or not it is regime type, or some other factor, that determines the level of 
economic complexity in this region. 
Transition economies have extensive differences in terms of economic policy, 
and, in turn, there is a significant range in their economic complexity. The economic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
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complexity index (ECI), proposed by Cesar A. Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann is a way 
of interpreting economic growth and development, by analyzing how well the knowledge 
of individuals in a country is collected by organizations and markets to produce 
exported.2 Quantitatively, an economic complexity score “[interprets] trade data as a 
bipartite network in which countries are connected to the products they export.” The 
score also evaluates countries and goods based on the volume of trade between countries 
and the ubiquity of products.3 In this way, the economic complexity score categorizes and 
quantifies a country’s economic network, productive output, and the ability to combine 
knowledge towards the added value of a given product. Additionally, the level of 
economic complexity, following the network of exported products from a country, 
converges to a level of income for a country, determining a predictive level of economic 
growth.4 By showing the revealed comparative advantage and the ubiquity of goods 
within a country, the ECI shows the level of specialization created by educational and 
industrial sectors. Hidalgo and Hausmann argue that “economic complexity matters 
because it helps explain differences in the level of income of countries, and more 
importantly, because it predicts future economic growth.”5 Additionally, as Thomas 
Remington and other scholars note, changing levels of income and economic diversity 
lead to changing economic class systems, such as the growth of a middle-class, which is a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Ricardo Hausmann and César A. Hidalgo et al., The Atlas of Economic Complexity: 
Mapping Paths to Prosperity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014), 15. 
3 Hidalgo, Cesar A. and Ricardo Hausmann, “The building blocks of economic 
complexity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 106, no. 2 (2009) 10570. 
4 Hidalgo and Hausmann, “The building blocks of Economic complexity,” 10570. 
5 Hausmann and Hidalgo et al., The Atlas of Economic Complexity, 29. 
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determining factor in occurrences of democracy.6 Therefore, it is meaningful to view the 
relationship between changes in the level of democracy to changes in the economic 
complexity score. 
Accordingly, this research relates a country’s ability to effectively transfer 
knowledge, as expressed through its ECI score, through the lens of Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson’s way of viewing how institutions are split between inclusive and 
extractive structures. The scholars’ perception of how countries develop along these 
opposing institutional lines informs the project’s understanding of the divergence 
between the political and economic outcomes of the transition economies.7 This work, in 
turn, views how the creation of inclusive or extractive institutions, measured here with a 
level of democracy, relates to a level of economic performance, here measured in 
economic complexity. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the two are deeply related, that 
political institutions support and are supported by economic institutions. Therefore, it is 
the road of transition, the particular choices of state building, and the persistence of these 
choices that have created the transition economies as we know them today. The history of 
transition, therefore, can help better evaluate the modern, cyclical connection between 
economic complexity and democracy. Perceived success or failures of political and 
economic reforms, based on the level of economic complexity, can also be evaluated.  
In short, the theoretical framework of this research project focuses on how the 
changing nature of these countries creates a feedback loop, in which regime types affect 
the level of economic complexity that in turn influences the autonomy and the prosperity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Thomas Remington, Politics of Inequality in Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012). 
7 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Books, 2013), 430. 
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of the people, influencing their political decisions. By questioning the source of 
differences in democratic performance and the relatively new measurement of economic 
complexity, this project fits both into and challenges the existing research on economic 
transition in Eastern Europe in addition to extending to a discussion about Central Asia. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter of the thesis begins with a discussion of the historical narrative 
of the political and economic reforms enacted throughout Eastern European and Central 
Asian transition economies from 1989 until the present. This chapter discusses the history 
of varying reform outcomes in the region. Featured within the larger narrative are 
regressions of the aggregated group concerning the connection between levels of 
democracy and economic complexity as well as how their economic performance 
diverged over time. The first chapter ends in the discussion of how and why the three 
case studies were chosen for further analysis.  
 Chapters two through four are devoted to the case studies of this project: Poland, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. These discuss in further detail the economic and historical 
landscape of the countries as well as present statistical regressions concerning various 
economic and developmental factors. Additionally, these chapters analyze the problems 
and limitations within each country, which help explain the level of democracy and, in 
turn, economic performance. The thesis ends in summary of the findings of the case 
studies.  
Historical Overview 
The beginning of transition occurs during a period of a few years rather than all at 
once, with portions of Central Europe finding independence in 1989 after years of 
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political and social struggle. The Soviet Union, beginning with individual republics 
peeling off, fell into 15 independent states in 1991. This unequal divergence away from 
the state-controlled market and the subsequent deviations in economic and political 
policy has created the great variation that characterizes the region today. Central Europe, 
dominated by the Solidarity-led political forces of Poland and urged along by burgeoning 
movements in Czechoslovakia, was able to peacefully and swiftly negotiate the shift out 
of the communist block and into democratic market capitalism akin to the likes of 
Western Europe. The ease of transition seen here was built on decades of growing unrest 
and allowed the countries of Central Europe to fully transition relatively quickly, a 
movement that culminated in ascension to the European Union and ensuing economic 
relations.   
While the Baltics, which were the first to declare independence from the Soviet 
Union, were able to achieve this level of success as well, the rest of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU)8 has not been as successful. The Soviet Union’s sudden fall into 
independence coupled with the expectation of pro-market and democratic reforms left 
many of the former Soviet republics without the leadership, culture, or institutions 
necessary to facilitate the peaceful or well-coordinated transitions seen in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE)9 at the same time. They lacked the long-seated social-democratic 
movements that shaped institutions in Central Europe and allowed neo-liberal economic 
reforms to be successful. The attempts at transition, whether committed or neglected, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, see Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan 
9 Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
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under these conditions have produced the mix of economically and politically rich and 
poor countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
Literature Review 
The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a period of new beginnings in the region, 
with the appearance or evolution of 25 countries. The economic performance, measured 
in output, initially declined for these countries but began increasing, at various rates, at 
some point after the mid-1990s.10 Stanley Fischer and Ratna Sahay propose that 
commitment to structural reforms, most notably monetary policy, the pace of 
privatization, and source of capital flows, made by the countries in order to stabilize 
made significant difference in their success.11 Beyond these structural reforms, these 
scholars also note that particular factors helped determine a country’s likelihood of 
success, finding that countries in CEE were more likely to be characterized by speedy 
economic turnaround (output increasing rather than decreasing within a period of 6 
years), proximity to Western Europe (which provided incentives to join the EU), limited 
years under communism, and relatively improved economic conditions at the fall of 
communism, relative to the FSU.12 Another scholar, Georges de Menil adds that the idea 
of a return to Europe mobilized Central and Eastern European countries in a way that was 
not available to the FSU.13 Without a secure model to follow or direct encouragement 
from the European Union, Aslund Anders posits that the FSU was reluctant to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Stanley Fischer and Ratna Sahay, “The transition economies after ten years,” 
Working Paper 00/30 (February 2000): 4.  
11 Fischer and Sahay, “Transition economies,” 1. 
12 Fischer and Sahay, “Transition economies,” 21. ; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
13 Menil, Georges de, “History, Policy, and Performance in Two Transition 
Economies: Poland and Romania,” in In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on 
Economic Growth ed. Dani Rodrik (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003): 273. 
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fundamentally change its institutional structures. The countries of the FSU, therefore, 
stand in contrast to the energetic reform formula of successful transition as proposed by 
Fischer and Sahay, choosing instead gradual economic turnaround, held back by many 
years under communism.  
In addition, both Alexander Gorobets and Rafael Di Tella argue that culture and 
belief systems in these countries account for a lack of belief and support in a true market 
economy. It is true that countries that were most consistently committed to reform had 
the most immediate economic success, but these countries, as Fischer and Sahay gather, 
were “closest to Western Europe and had spent the least time under communist rule.”14 
Therefore, the idea of market success in the Central European region was the least alien 
and held significant public support. On the other hand, the less successful gradual 
reformers experienced a longer period of education under a communist system, meaning 
the general population had little faith or knowledge of successful democracy or market-
based economy. After years of disorganization during transition, many citizens still hold 
general mistrust of institutions themselves.15Belief systems represent the “human 
landscape” and formal institutions reflect the underlying structures of that landscape. In 
order to change the economic landscape and build a foundation for a sustainable, diverse 
economy, Di Tella argues that there needs to be a change in the widely shared belief 
systems.16 A swift, committed social-educational investment in changing these beliefs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Fischer and Sahay, “Transition economies,” 3. 
15 Alexander Gorobets, “An independent Ukraine: Sustainable or unsustainable 
development?” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 93-103. 
16 Rafael Di Tella, “Kazakhstan: Institutions,” in Growth and Competitiveness in 
Kazakhstan: Issues and Priorities in the Areas of Macroeconomic, Industrial, Trade and 
Institutional Development Policies, ed. Ricardo Hausmann (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), 70-81. 
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toward faith in market mechanisms is required to sufficiently alter the poor performing 
gradual reformers of the FSU.  
This thesis proposes a causation direction in the manner of how democracy affects 
economic complexity. Due to the complicated nature of transition from centralized 
command economies to liberalized market economies (or some variation thereof), 
institutional transformation has an far-reaching effect within each country and on the 
region as a whole. Democracy and capitalism did not arrive the moment the constitutions 
changed.17 We can see in the case of countries throughout the FSU, most notably the 
Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, when one authoritarian regime ended 
in 1991, another filled its place. These ideas and research were inspired by Thomas 
Remington’s book Politics of Inequality in Russia via his way of looking at how regime 
type and economics are linked in Russia. This research project expands these ideas to 
other transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  
While the larger traditional debate is that higher income leads to higher 
democracy scores, Remington finds that, when Russian republics are viewed 
individually, richer regions (in terms of economic output) are generally less democratic 
and less economically diverse, whereas and slightly poorer regions are more 
economically diverse with the presence of a quasi-middle class. This arises out of 
resource endowments across regions and subsequent unequal distribution of wealth.18 
Anders Aslund supports the basis of these findings, citing how self-interested oligarchs 
supported market economy transition, noting their presence as one of the reasons the FSU !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Ivan T. Berend, From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union: The Economic and 
Social   Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
18 Remington, Politics of Inequality in Russia. 
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initially grew more rapidly than CEE, but also was the cause of unsustainable growth.19 
Additionally, Joel Moses identifies that Russia and other FSU countries must face 
dilemmas, such as an oligarchical economic structure that arises from the short-term need 
for privatization, in order to meet the long-term goal of a democratized nation, in which a 
diversified economy can exist.20 The main takeaway from these works is that Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia may appear to be one way on the outside, but in practice and 
experience are completely different when further research is conducted. This is, in part, 
due to their status as transitional economies.  
Methodology 
 This project observes the history of the 25 transition economies of Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia together, grouping some into identifiable types, before delving further 
into the types through three case studies: Poland, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Statistical 
analysis allows for discussion about the group of transition economies as a whole to 
understand how they have operated as a unit over time. Moreover, the project follows a 
most similar different outcomes (MSDO) format, as each of the chosen cases has a 
similar history under communism and has been transitioning towards a market economy 
for a similar amount of time. Yet, they have drastically different levels of democracy and 
economic complexity. The case studies, Poland, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, were chosen 
based on their relative economic size, all within the top ten GDP outputs of the transition 
economies for 2017, and their position across the democracy index (DI) score, from 
flawed democracy (Poland) to hybrid regime (Ukraine) to authoritarian regime !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Anders Aslund, How Capitalism was Built: The Transformation of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
20Joel Moses, Dilemmas of Transition in Post-Soviet Countries (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 
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(Kazakhstan). The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) defines democracy as a “set of 
practices and principles that institutionalize and thus ultimately protect freedom,” and 
produces rankings of Democracy Index score, which uses survey data to evaluate 
political institutions, culture, and participation within countries.21 These rankings provide 
the initial basis for understanding the democratic background of each case study. 
Each case study begins with a historical narrative in the context of their individual 
groups. In order to properly analyze the difference between these countries within the last 
decade, it is necessary to discuss how they arrived in their current economic and political 
state. This narrative covers their transitions from the end of communism until the present, 
taking inspiration from the methodologies from Fischer & Sahay, Berend, and others. 
Most importantly this historical review discusses the economic landscape and natural 
resource endowments of the three states, which is important for this discussion for their 
trade patterns. 
The main economic assessment function of this project is the statistical 
connection between democracy index and economic complexity scores, but this is too 
simplistic to view by itself. Therefore, the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and 
intra-industrial trade (IIT) levels for each country are used as disaggregate measures of 
the economic complexity scores. RCA, created by Bela Balassa, is used in the 
formulation of the ECI and shows if a country has a comparative advantage in certain 
goods by comparing the global share of trade with how much a country exports. If the 
country exports more than the global average, this reveals that the country has a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat," 
Economist Intelligence Unit.(http://www. eiu. com/public/democracy_index. aspx), 
accessed January 25 (2010): 2011, 28-30. 
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comparative advantage in said good.22 IIT is further improvement on RCA, and shows 
the extent of trade within industries of different countries. The “goal” is to have an IIT 
score closer to 1, where industries export and import at equal rates, which reveals a level 
of economic specialization and complexity.23 In each case study, these values are 
supported by qualitative evidence of the political structures behind the economic outputs. 
In support of the economic data analysis for each country, OLS models analyze 
the trends of how the countries have changed economically and administratively over the 
past ten years. These OLS models show how various development and economic 
(independent) variables interact with one another and result in a ECI outcome, the 
dependent variable, while showing the strength and significance of those interactive 
trends. Here, the models test the how the democracy index score, GDP per capita, 
manufacturing as a percent of GDP, urban population, inflation, mineral rents as a 
percent of GDP, and trade as a percent of GDP affect the ECI score. These independent 
variables were chosen based on similar models produced by Thomas Remington and 
provide possible alternative explanations to economic complexity growth. 24 These 
variables are tested with a country-year unit of analysis, with data for years 2006-2016. 
World Bank data for development factors are used to run these models. Additionally, the 
World Bank’s Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), 
which is a collection of surveys and other data from business leaders in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia, presents a background surrounding economic attitudes and beliefs. 
Used to contextualize the larger data analysis, BEEPS provides a qualitative review of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Ricardo Hausman & Cesar A. Hidalgo et al. The Atlas of Economic Complexity 
23 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Mare J. Melitz, International Trade: 
Theory and Policy (New York: Pearson Education, 2015), 177-179. 
24 Remington, Politics of Inequality in Russia. 
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businesses and business culture, vital for the success and growth of international trade, in 
the target countries. 
Results 
Building on Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s study of the connected nature of a 
country’s politics and the economy, this research shows that institutional structure, which 
is associated with a level of democracy, of these transitional states affects the 
productivity and success of the economic climate. Therefore, in the case of these 
transition economies, the more authoritarian a country is, the less economic complexity 
the country will have. These trends create a feedback loop that results in generally less 
democratic and less productive states, where low economic complexity perpetuate and 
support one another as time goes on and make it more difficult to improve in either area. 
Here, high levels of authoritarianism, thus, inadequately distributed wealth and power, 
negatively affect the real incomes and success of the population. Although there are 
variations in the strength of correlation and the significance of democracy on countries’ 
economic diversification, the trend is still present in each case studied. 
 In reviewing the data, Poland’s performance in economic complexity closely 
follows changes in democracy over time, with a one to two-year delay. This strongly 
supports the hypothesis that changes in institutional structure (democracy) lead to 
changes in economic complexity. Moreover, there is a mix of complex and non-complex 
industries in the country combined with a history of civil society and democracy building 
institutions. These economic and political realities are supported by the democratic values 
and free-trade measures of the European Union. Nevertheless, some of the results do not 
strictly follow the hypothesis. Poland’s data does exhibit a negative relationship between 
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economic complexity and democracy and the OLS models have no significance, with a 
strong R-squared output. The recent non-democratic trends in Poland’s political climate 
has created turbulence in the data.  
 On the other hand, Ukraine lacks the EU incentives and support that could fortify 
democratically and economically complex activities. Shown in a time series, changes in 
the DI score are followed by a change in the ECI score, while the time-delay and 
magnitude of the changes are less uniform than in the time-series data for Poland. Like 
many countries of the FSU, Ukraine has experienced issues defining its own social and 
political identity in the years since 1991. Attempts to create supportive, inclusive 
institutions, which could have allowed the population to thrive, generally failed as 
centralized, oligarchic power became the norm. This has resulted in a weak mix of 
economically complex industries and lack of a strong civil society. Ukraine does not 
perfectly fit within the parameters of the hypothesis because it is a “hybrid democracy,” 
not necessarily authoritarian or fully democratic. The data outputs are similar. For these 
reasons, Ukraine does not fit perfectly within the bounds of the hypothesis. While there is 
an overall positive relationship in Ukraine’s ECI and DI scores, changes in democracy 
over time often resulted in adverse effects on economic complexity. Nevertheless, 
democracy has been greatly revitalized after the internal political revolutions of 2004 and 
2014, and these popular pushes to define Ukrainian political identity have proved to be 
economically beneficial. OLS models for this case study are also not significant, yet the 
R-squared value is even greater when democracy index is included. This shows that the 
data is very closely connected to the trendline. Following these social movements, a 
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greater connection and subsequent improvement of both DI and ECI scores is expected in 
the future.  
 The positive correlation between the DI and ECI scores for Kazakhstan follows 
the hypothesis, but the connection of the two variables over time shows a less clear 
relationship. Here, the level of economic complexity, along the lines of the hypothesis, 
again follows movements in the change in democracy, yet perhaps disrupted by the 
influence of changes in oil prices, on which the country strongly depends. Additionally, 
there is a drastic increase in economic complexity that is not predated by an increase of 
democracy of a similar size. This is not directly due democratic change but, instead, 
internal moves to diversify while oil prices were low. While this phenomenon does not 
directly follow the hypothesis, authoritarian Kazakhstan faces a resource curse and, 
therefore, has economically specialized in relatively few ubiquitous goods, and overall 
does not have a strong predictive future without further diversification. Extractive 
institutions have, therefore, traded long-term sustainable growth for short-term power and 
stability. This is especially true as democracy scores continue to decline and 
authoritarianism persists, all of which has led to a weak civil society and free-market 
culture. This is also the only case in which the OLS models follow the hypothesis and 
produce significant results with very high R-squared scores. This leads to the idea that, if 
democracy and economic complexity scores are low, development factors have greater 
effect on the diversity of the economy.  
 These results are further fleshed out in the coming case study chapters. As 
explained previously, each attempts to highlight a type of transition economy, in terms of 
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size, history, and transitional status. Through understanding these cases, we can better 
understand the transition economies as a whole. 
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Chapter 1: 
Defining the Histories of the 25 Transition Economies 
1.1 Breakdown of the Communist Block 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 marked the beginning of a transitional period. 
Suddenly, the countries of Central Europe, Southeast Europe and the newly independent 
former Soviet republics faced the task of rewriting their master narratives as countries 
and their economic policies. What emerges are different interpretations of a market 
economy, based on the varied histories, social structures, and economic powers within 
each country. This project evaluates the outcomes of these various interpretations of a 
market economy as they developed from a group of largely similar, in terms of levels of 
economic complexity, centrally-planned command economies. In order to simplify the 
discussion of these 25 countries, I have grouped 4 examples into three types, with a case 
study to be examined in greater detail later. Yet, first, the history of transition economies 
will be discussed. 
In post-War Europe, American and Soviet powers worked to establish of spheres 
of influence, as Stalin strived to create a socialist “buffer zone” in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Internally, in a mass rejection of fascism in the wake of World War II, 
communist parties, strongly backed by Soviet support, swept elections in the years after 
1945. These elections were followed by mass nationalizations, i.e. the movement of 
private enterprise into government control. Ivan Berend writes that even “communist-
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dominated regimes, without an open adoption of monolithic Soviet communism, became 
subservient allies of the Soviet Union.”25 
For these reasons, the communist system of Eastern Europe and Central Asia was 
initially defined by Stalin’s oppressive political structures that created the prevailing 
method of rule in this region and demanded Soviet-style socialism. Janos Kornai remarks 
that this model of socialism began with “undivided political power of the ruling party, the 
interpretation of the party and the state, and the suppression of all forces that depart from 
or oppose the party’s policy.” 26 This demanding political system coupled with complete 
nationalization was meant to “render the restoration of capitalism impossible.”27 
Nevertheless, implementation of these goals differed slightly within the communist block 
and ultimately failed to provide the structures necessary to cope with the rapidly 
globalizing world economy of the 20th century, leading to the collapse of the communist 
system by 1991.  
1.2 Economic Developments During the Soviet Period 
Despite depressing democracy throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 
communist party rule allowed the region to industrialize at an incredible pace. Economic 
policy, especially in the beginning, was based on the pragmatic goals of modernizing and 
the industrializing vast, rural “peasant” areas while also creating a “just” society beyond 
the bounds of class distinction and wealth. Socialists set up an authoritarian regime to 
achieve these goals, sacrificing individual freedoms for the national good. While these 
methods helped to modernize the countries within the Soviet bloc, they could not keep up !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Tibor Iván Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: Detour from the 
Periphery to the Periphery, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 25. 
26 Janos Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 360. 
27 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 12. 
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with the socio-economic modernization of the rest of the developed world. These 
countries overvalued investment in heavy industry at the expense of other economic 
activities. Therefore, by the time accelerated economic growth ceased in the 1970s, CEE 
and the Soviet Union had fallen behind on a technological and infrastructural basis. These 
obstacles persisted beyond 1989 and 1991.  
1.3 End of Communism 
In an era of popular revolutions around the world, forces in Central and Eastern 
Europe began to push back against the strict structure of Soviet-style communism during 
the 1960s, 70s, and onward. These movements were the culmination of civil unrest that 
began appearing after the death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent “thaw” of Soviet 
policy in CEE and the USSR. The most notable of these political movements occurred 
with the 1956 Hungarian and Polish revolts and the Prague Spring in 1968, resulting in 
Soviet invasion.  
The Polish revolt of ‘56 was comprised of many different groups, some 
intellectuals and some workers, and culminated in July in a meeting of the Central 
Committee of the Polish party, which stipulated half-enforced reforms, such as a faux 
multi-party system. While economic reforms were limited, reformers established some 
market measures into the planned economy, such as decreases in compulsory plans and 
the small-scale liberalization of cottage industries.28 Democratizing elements of these 
reforms, while not fully realizing the goals of the uprising, established a degree of 
pluralism and personal freedom “unparalleled in other countries of the region.”29 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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29 Ibid., 116. 
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Nonetheless, these moves show the gradual institutional change that occurred in Eastern 
Europe after the death of Stalin.  
The same gradual moves were not possible in the Soviet Union during the same 
time, and it was not until Mikhail Gorbachev’s institutional restructuring that the 
communist system in the 1980s would fall into widespread, popular trouble. In order to 
combat rising inflation and falling growth rates, Gorbachev instituted a series of market 
reforms, known as Perestroika. This “reworking” attempted to establish small market 
reforms and more autonomy for the republics. Creating perhaps too much regional power, 
these reforms failed to achieve the economic growth hoped for and did much to break 
down long-held party beliefs. Gorbachev's moves towards a market economy and 
socialism with a more human “face” pushed the country into transition but did not do 
enough to prepare the republics to successfully transition when the Soviet Union fell in 
1991. Thus, the pro-market trajectories at the end of communism created the impetus that 
further differentiated their transitional pathways.  
Meanwhile, the early 1980s in CEE, marked the end of the Brezhnev doctrine, a 
Soviet enforcement measure in Central Europe, and thus signaled the beginning of a 
systematic exit from the socialist systems of the past. These exits took place in three 
forms: negotiated transition, as in Poland; popular revolt, as in Czechoslovakia; and 
communist coups, as in Romania. Poland, for example, built upon the momentum of 
decades of popular dissent, most notably from the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic 
Church. Roundtable negotiations between communist and opposition leaders resulted in 
the decision to hold parliamentary elections in September 1989, which brought a 
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landslide victory for Solidarity.30 The Polish government was, therefore, able to 
peacefully transfer power and begin the process of pro-market transition.  
1.4 Free-market transition 
For example, Poland’s peaceful negotiation of both political and economic power 
today stands as a model for how other countries in the region could establish democratic 
and free-market structures. These movements were able to survive due to bottom-up 
liberalizing movements that occurred during the latter half of the 20th century. The most 
significant mobilizing force in the region was a resident of Poland: The Solidarity 
Movement. This group, which was aligned with the Roman Catholic Church, began as a 
unionizing force in Poland and ultimately, through decades of political struggle, brought 
about democratic elections in 1989, which overthrew the Communist party majority.31 
These elections continued the democratic trajectory that had been building since the 
1950s and brought the country into an independent, democratic future.  
These democratic reforms instituted the economic reforms that would bring 
Poland into enhanced economic performance and complexity. Initially, the “Washington 
Consensus,” mained at privatizing as much as possible, was adhered to in order to receive 
international financial support. Despite initial economic decline, such as a sharp rise in 
unemployment with changing labor regulations, these privatization measures helped to 
diversify the economy.32 Using positive aspects of initial transition policy, the private 
sector was then opened up to market constraints and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
subject to budget constraints, microeconomic efficiency, and maximization of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 21. 
31 Berend. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery, 266. 
32 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 92; Grzegorz W. Kolodko, “A two-thirds 
success. Poland’s post-communist transformation 1989-2009,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 42 (2009): 325-327. 
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government revenue. The success of this was Poland’s ascension in 1996 to OECD. Such 
institution-building benefited the society at large, leading to decreased inequality, more 
advantages to entrepreneurs, and more people coming back to Poland.33  
These successes are owed to the gradual structural policy, which was at odds with 
the Washington Consensus of rapid privatization and shock therapy. Poland’s economic 
policy has since struggled to combine the aspects of shock therapy and gradualism. As a 
result, periods of overcooling occurred just as the “the Polish economy was opening to 
external contacts, grass-roots business was flourishing, microeconomic management was 
improving.”34 Despite these issues, Poland’s economic and political improvement 
allowed the country to come into the EU and continue the process of macroeconomic 
management, the building of local governments, and the reception of EU membership 
benefits.  
Grzegorz Kolodko outlines some of the lessons other developing countries can 
learn from Poland’s transformation. These lessons include the introduction of “economic 
reforms that increase[d] the flexibility of markets.”35 To enforce these economic reforms, 
systematic reconfiguring of the “legal and organizational framework” is vital.36 
Furthermore, the country should balance different policies, understanding the social costs 
of each. The rest of central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia and Hungary, despite 
slightly different movements into transition, followed the same model as Poland, 
implementing “radical structural reforms” of privatization and price liberalization from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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34 Ibid., 330.  
35 Ibid., 342. 
36 Ibid., 343. 
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1990 onward.37 Built upon a history of willingness to reform, institutional changes 
allowed Central Europe as a whole to become resilient, fully-fledged market economies 
with access to the democratic benefits and greater economic environment of the European 
Union.  
1.5 Mitigated Market Transition 
Where Central Europe moved forward through popular movements and 
demonstrations, leading the way to broad-based change, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
left both the masses and their leaders reluctant or unready for change. Gorbachev's 
democratic reforms allowed the republics to grow in national legitimacy and, 
subsequently, rapidly break away from the whole. Gorbachev underestimated the 
enduring national identities of certain key republics, especially the Baltics and Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the democratization efforts at the national level eroded the legitimacy of the 
union, causing a “war of laws.”As the republics broke away, they followed patterns of 
initial transition: an attempt at democratic and economic reform, as in Russia; determined 
reform, as in the Baltics; retained communist power, as in Ukraine; war-disrupted reform, 
as in Georgia; and continued authoritarian rule, as in Kazakhstan.38  
1.6 Partial democratic and free-market transition 
Ukraine experienced similar pro-national and anti-communist forces as 
experienced in Central Europe, but they were not enough to gain a majority and 
fundamentally change the institutional structures left behind by the Soviet Union. Instead, 
the same communist leaders from the previous regime capitalized on nationalist 
movements and rebranded themselves. Continued debate over the split of power between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 85. 
38 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 24-28. 
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the president and the parliament throughout the 1990s resulted in the subsequent loss of 
local self-governance and “threatened civil rights and political representation.”39 Power 
remained concentrated in the hands of the few with the rise of powerful oligarchies, and 
is why Illya Prizel posits that “Ukraine lacked both an elite committed to democratic 
reforms and liberal economics and a fully developed, capable democratic alternative.”40 
These forces led to the erosion of the strong civil society necessary to provide support for 
democracy “from below.” Without these proper pro-democratic institutions in place, 
Ukraine failed to transition politically with the same success as the Baltics. Furthermore, 
unlike the Baltics, which received formal backing from the European Union, Ukraine 
could not fully turn away from the economic and political offerings from Moscow, and, 
in turn, were caught between the pulls of both Russia and the European Union.41 This 
leaves both the elites and the populous with political fatigue.  
Economically, Ukraine did follow the lead of Poland and Central Europe with the 
implementation of market reforms, but only gradually. Whereas Central Europe was 
marketized by 1992, Ukraine and others, such as Russia, Georgia, Armenia, etc., only 
achieved the status of full market economies in 2000. These countries struggled to 
privatize, leading to the creation of massive former SOEs, and price liberalization in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) proved more difficult than in Central 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Europe, due to greater distortion in prices.42 At the head of former SOEs, holding 
massive political and economic power, an oligarchic class appeared in the region, most 
notably in Ukraine and Russia. These “financial-political groups” established patron-
client networks and protected against uncertainty, in the 1990s, helping to solve both 
“collective and individual problems.”43  While beneficial in the short term, these 
networks have been hard to dismantle in the long term. Therefore, gradual policy, while 
perhaps initially less violently tumultuous to the population, resulted in countries that 
struggle to continue the momentum of the pro-democratic dreams of initial transition and 
become full market economies. 
1.7 Non-democratic and non-free-market 
Across Central Asia and Belarus, authoritarian rule has continued after 
independence. Communist leaders, and the structures they represented stayed in power. 
Although the Communist party was widely abolished, the systems of power, i.e. clans, 
remained the same. Oil revenues and other natural resources also seriously affected the 
establishment of power, as leaders were afraid to democratize and lose their lucrative 
power. Nazarbayev, leader of Kazakhstan, in relation to its neighbors, did slightly soften 
his dictatorship and chose to enact gradual market reforms but has remained in power 
since 1991.44   
In Kazakhstan, remnants of the communist system make up the institutional 
structure. This ultra-centralized political structure has created and maintained enduring 
patron-client networks. The mentality that arise from these patron-client networks !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 88. 
43 Minakov and Rojanky, Democracy in Ukraine, 3. 
44 During the writing of this thesis (spring 2019), Nazarbayev resigned, but his power 
structures remain largely intact. 
!25 
 
perpetuates corruption and prevents the creation of self-advocating civil society 
organizations. Furthermore, the large, lucrative natural resource endowments and the 
rents they create has further tempered political participation. These factors combine to 
create incentives to limit democratic institutions and turn away from a complete free-
market system. This lack of positive incentives is why Kazakhstan and the Central Asian 
region lags behind the rest of the transition economies.   
1.8 Further review of reforms 
 The countries discussed above followed up their initial transition periods, whether 
they be straightforward or bloody, with economic policy reform towards a market 
economy. This calls up the great debate over the means and processes of economic 
reform. Should reforms take place quickly, to “shock” the economy? Or should reforms 
be established gradually to ease the population into a capitalist system and avoid short-
term austerity? A look into these questions will be discussed below. In practice, the 
choice between these two main methods of economic transition was clearly divided along 
the conditions under which the country transitioned.  
Throughout all the transition economies, some form of neoliberal reforms were 
instituted. Neoliberal reforms consist of some combination of the following revisions: 
macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, privatization, and a reinforcement of a social 
safety net.45 The first main course of divergence arose in the choice of the speed and 
aggression of reforms. Radical, “shock therapy,” reformers in Central Europe and the 
Baltics hoped to create new economic policy that would swiftly and comprehensively 
cement and market economy, limit short-term social costs, and retain support for the new 
government. The flaws, and accompanying fears, of this type of policy are that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Aslund Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 33. 
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disorganization and inaccurate information, coupled with the incomplete belief in 
markets from the people, in the beginning, could prove both politically and economically 
risky for the state. Therefore, democracy, according to Aslund Anders, is the hand 
necessary to retain social and political order necessary to ensure the capitalist model.46 In 
CEE, as outlined above, democratic reforms ran parallel and supported economic 
reforms. Those that chose radical reforms and displayed no trust in the old way were 
willing to risk short-term losses of pulling back state economic intervention to fully 
liberalize prices and privatize industries. This radical ideology of moving against the old 
way is the distinct factor separating shock therapy supporters from those backing and 
enacting more gradual reforms. Some Western scholars did support gradual rather than 
radical reforms, stating the risk of disruption to democratic reforms via recession-fuelled 
social unrest, the need for continued social engineering, and the time required for full 
institutional transition, among others. Nevertheless, in practice, the main reason to forego 
radical reform was the presence of leadership unwilling to turn too far away from their 
communist past.  
Consequently, in much of the FSU, the belief in the communist state continued, at 
least in part. In this regard, leaders conducted gradual market reforms in order to retain as 
much, if not more, power as they had held before. For example, rent-seeking ballooned 
throughout the block of transition economies during the initial years but was shut out 
where radical reforms took place. In gradual reforming countries, rent seekers initially 
encouraged transition, because they were able to skim off the top during the times of 
disorganization but ultimately delayed further transition in order to prolong their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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earnings.47 The many countries who participated in gradual reforms have retained similar 
patterns of corruption to the present day. Moreover, citizens of these countries are less 
likely to support a free-market in their belief systems, especially without a substantial 
avenue to express such beliefs.  
1.9 History of Transition Economies within Development Theory 
Another way of understanding the historical divergence of the transition 
economies between the successful transition of the radical reformers and the stumbling 
performance of the gradualists, as well as the persistence of their respective economic 
and political choices over time, is through the lens of institutional developmental theory, 
as proposed by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. These scholars believe in the 
power of inclusive and extractive institutions to create either inclusive or exclusive 
economic systems. Through this lens, they propose terminology and institutional models 
that can help explain how this group of transition economies has diverged according to 
institutional histories and structures.  
Acemoglu and Robinson have developed a way of characterizing political 
movements into two defining models--inclusive or extractive. They argue that, based on 
the country’s existing institutions, virtuous or vicious cycles are formed, only breakable 
by critical junctures in history. On this basis, there is a persistent feedback loop between 
political-institutional structure and the performance of the economic institution. Based on 
the review of the history of initial transitions and the varying speeds of economic reform, 
the transition economies follow Acemoglu and Robinson’s model of intertwined 
economic and democratic movement. The extractive absolutist model is generally 
troublesome for the generation of inclusive institutions. In fact, these scholars find, that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Ibid., 52. 
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the communist regimes set up extractive economic institutions “designed to extract 
resources from the people, and by entirely abhorring property rights, [leaders] often 
created poverty instead of prosperity.”48 These authors support this claim by outlining the 
current state of the Uzbek political structure, which retained the authoritarian power of 
President Karimov into the independence period, as it retains the extractive absolutist 
structure of the Soviet-socialist era.49 These accounts show how resistant former 
communist, and most particularly Soviet, systems of power have been to change in the 
last quarter century. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe that were first to peacefully, 
determinedly transition, such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltics, best fall into the 
category of countries with inclusive institutions. Political power is spread broadly 
throughout society yet retains a centralized, with cohesive law and order as well as well-
defined property rights.50 Shown in the negotiated transitions and popular revolts that 
propelled Central and Eastern Europe towards radical economic reform, new institutions 
were able to replace the old. To measure the “inclusiveness” of the institutions, the level 
of democracy, via the Democracy Index score is used because it measures democracy by 
measuring how widely freedom and power are distributed. Therefore, countries that have 
higher levels of democracy are judged to have more inclusive institutions, which are able 
to form what Acemoglu and Robinson call virtuous cycles.  
On the other hand, countries that were more stubborn in the transition process, 
such as Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan have fairly low democracy scores. Based on 
their collective collapse into transition and leaders’ insistence on gradual transition, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48  Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 390. 
49 Ibid., 392-394. 
50 Ibid., 430. 
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character of these countries is that of extractive institutions. Such countries may have 
short-lived growth (Kazakhstan), but fail to create effective, sustainable economic 
institutions because of the fear of true destruction of the old power structures for the new. 
This has been evidenced above through the high occurrence of rent-seeking in the early 
days of transition, delayed by leaders who chose gradual transition. Therefore, extractive 
institutions tend to persist, creating a vicious cycle. This plays into the hypothesis, that 
authoritative regimes have low economic complexity, creating a feedback loop of low 
economic performance. 
 
There is a great range of economic complexities for the group, especially 
considering that the group had clustered scores at the beginning of the transition period, 
as seen in Chart 1.1. This chart reveals that, through choosing differing political and 
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economic policies, the transition economies followed diverging development paths. 
Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan notes that “[s]ome have managed to build complex 
production economies; while others' comparative advantage remains in raw materials.”51 
When viewed today (using 2015 data), these countries tend to group into three distinct 
types. There are the high achievers, as shown in the Chart 1.2  with full or flawed 
democracies, and high economic complexity scores. This first group is made up of 
European Union members Poland, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and the Baltics and 
exhibits inclusive, broadly representative institutions. On the other end, there are those 
that have low democracy scores coupled with low economic complexity. This group, 
made up of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, exhibit extractive, 
non-representative institutions. The middle, “grey zone” group is made up of countries 
that have mainly a democratically “hybrid regime,” somewhere between authoritarianism 
and democracy, with mid-range values for economic complexity. This group is made up 
of Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova and have mixed institutions with 
constantly transforming structures, especially due to recent public revolutions.  
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Chart 1.2 shows there is a clear, positive correlation between democracy scores 
and economic complexity. To better understand the mechanisms of this trend, the 
following chapters will further dive into the interplay between economics and democracy 
within each of the three types of transition economies, highlighting one country from 
each. The transitional pioneer Poland represents the first group and shows the importance 
of consistent, gradual pushes for change in terms of the success of subsequent political 
and economic reforms. Ukraine represents the “grey zone” countries and exhibits the 
dilemmas of an ideologically split population, the persistence of previous political 
organization, and the importance of critical junctures brought on by popular revolutions. 
Lastly, Kazakhstan represents the last group. While Kazakhstan has taken a relatively 
more open view towards trade and leadership, the country’s economic and political 
situation still demonstrates the difficulties of altering the plight of countries will great 
TJK!TKM!
UZB! AZE! ALB!MDA!
KAZ! GEO!KGZ!MKD!
UKR!RUS! BGR!LVA!LTU!BLR! HRV!
ROU! EST!POL!
SVK!HUN! SVN!CZE!
y!=!0.3007x!B!1.2777!R²!=!0.62583!
B1.5!
B1!
B0.5!
0!
0.5!
1!
1.5!
2!
0! 1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9!
Econom
ic!Com
plexity
!Index!
Score!
Democracy!Index!Score!
Chart!1.2:!Democracy!Index!Score!vs.!Economic!Complexity!Index!(2015)!
!32 
 
natural resource endowments, lasting clan networks, and poor models for fair, free 
transition.  
Table 1.1 Combined Case 
Study OLS 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Democracy Index Score  .2210 
(.1257) 
Lagged Democracy Index 
Score 
 -.0520 
(.0732) 
GDP per capita -.0004** 
(.0002) 
-.0002 
(.0002) 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 6.42e-11** 
(2.03e-11) 
3.45e-11  
(2.87e-11) 
Urban population -5.26e-08  
(4.65e-08) 
-2.45e-08 
(5.64e-08) 
Inflation .0087  
(.0080) 
.0049  
(.0082) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP -.0173 
(.0608) 
.0081 
(.0615) 
Trade (% of GDP) -.0177  
(.0099) 
-.0074  
(.0111) 
Number of Observations 27 26 
R-squared . 9144 0.9325 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
 
In preliminary OLS models (Table 1.1), using data from all three case studies 
with the years 2006-2016 as the unit of analysis, democracy is an insignificant factor 
determining ECI. When democracy is not included in Model 1, GDP per capita and 
manufacturing (% of GDP) are the only significant factors related to ECI. GDP per 
capita, which is expected to lead to higher complexity via greater individual economic 
opportunities, actually has a negative relationship with ECI. Increases in the 
manufacturing percentage of GDP has a minimal, positive relationship with ECI. The R-
squared values for both of these models is very high, showing that, while little of this data 
is significant, there is little variation in the data as a whole. These OLS models bring the 
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validity of the hypothesis into question, as democracy is an insignificant factor in 
relationship to ECI development.  
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Chapter 2 
Poland: Profound Democratizing Impact of Committed, Early Transition 
Now a part of the European Union, Poland has successfully transitioned and 
stands as an example, in terms of reform policy, for other transitioning economies in the 
region. Poland’s group of high performers, consisting of Poland, the Czech Republic, the 
Baltics, and Romania, all have achieved high levels of economic complexity and score 
relatively well democratically. The countries in this group are, based on their DI score, 
“flawed democracies,” meaning that free and fair elections are present and civil liberties 
are respected while there is still an “underdeveloped political culture and low levels of 
political participation.”52 Furthermore, these countries have managed to develop the 
institutions necessary to have relatively high levels of economic complexity, revealing 
the population’s level of economic capability to produce high knowledge goods.53 This 
discussion of Poland will examine the country’s communist history and early reforms, a 
look into how ECI and DI are connected in terms of Poland’s democratic institutions, an 
overview of Poland’s business culture, and a comparison of how different development 
factors influence ECI. In understanding the triumphs and shortfalls of Poland, we can 
understand the institutional reforms recommended for a successful transition.  
In the wake of World War II, as Europe was drawn along the lines of the standing 
Allied armies, Poland, like the rest of CEE, fell under communist rule, supported by the 
Soviet Union. As depicted by the popular demonstrations throughout the 1950s, 60s, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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53 Hidalgo and Hausmann et al., The Atlas of Economic Complexity, 16-18. 
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70s, opinion and conditions under communism were unfavorable.54 This history of 
underlying dissent allowed the labor union Solidarity to gain traction and support. 
Solidarity hoped, as Berend suggests, to provide an “authentic representation of the 
working class.”55 Polish leaders, like others during this era of “post-socialist shift,” 
moved away from efforts to transform the socialist economic system and towards 
building a new capitalist market economy. Similar revolutionary movements were 
present in Czechoslovakia and the Baltics, but Poland was the trailblazer, being the first 
to implement open market reforms.56 Solidarity was able to overthrow communist rule in 
Poland’s 1989 legislative elections, an event known as the largest rejection of communist 
rule in history.  
With Solidarity at the head, the new Polish state had the following goals: price 
liberalization, monetary policy, and market expansion. These reforms occurred during a 
short transition time from 1989 until 1992. This brief transition time is not so much a 
result of precise policy but rather improvements upon reforms implemented during 
socialism. Poland’s bottom-up push for privatization was perhaps one of the most 
successful political reforms. Brian Levy posits that transforming states lack the 
organizational structure to carry out many necessary transitional tasks. Therefore, in 
order to overcome “low organizational capability,” states should begin systematic reform 
with “stroke of the pen” (legislative) measures before more organizationally intensive 
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ones.57 This makes privatization “from below” easier before organizing a large-scale 
“from above” system. In Poland’s case, this meant the creation of laws and institutions 
that allowed at least partial private enterprise during the communist period and ease of 
full private enterprise after. Especially in the beginning of transition, these moves 
allowed for more semi-seamless privatization of enterprises by more ordinary citizens, 
not only powerful elites. These committed, systematic economic reforms were able to 
produce the “Polish economic miracle” because there was an accompanying societal shift 
towards democracy.58  
2.1 Economic Complexity Score by Democracy Index Score 
Therefore, there is some connection between the democratic reforms Poland was 
able to make in 1989 and their steady trend of an increasing level of economic 
complexity. Surprisingly, despite the steady increase in ECI scores, there is actually a 
slightly negative correlation between Poland’s DI and ECI scores between the years 2006 
and 2017, as shown Chart 2.1. This trend is not very strong, but it does disprove the 
original hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between DI and ECI scores. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Brian Levy,  “An institutional analysis of the design and sequence of trade and 
investment policy 
reform, The World Bank Economic Review 7 no. 2 (1993), 247–262. 
 
58 Kolodko, “A Two-thirds success.” 
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Nevertheless, when ECI and DI are graphed together over time, across two axes, 
there is a perceivable effect on ECI when DI changes. As seen in the Chart 2.2, there 
appears to be a time delay reaction in the economic complexity score, following the 
democracy index score. The first indication of this trend occurs as DI begins to decline in 
2008, a trend which lasts until 2010. ECI initially remains stagnant but eventually 
significantly falls from 2011 until 2013, mirroring the DI trend from 2008-2010. Again, 
the trend occurs in reverse from 2013 until 2015. DC rises sharply from 2013 to 2014. 
ECI rises sharply from 2014 to 2015. The only unanswered question is the ECI result 
from the drastic DI decline beginning in 2014. Future data is necessary to answer this 
question.  
Trends are even more clear when observing the magnitude change (first 
derivative), shown in Chart 2.2. Even though the direct regression of the two factors 
results in a negative relationship between the two variables, this time-series chart shows 
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that there is a significant relationship between the movement of the two variables 
together. As DI has declined in recent years, ECI may soon decline as well.  
 
 
It is necessary to understand the underlying economic conditions and 
accompanying political causes that have created this phenomenon. The discussion and 
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analysis of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) and the intra-industrial trade (IIT) 
patterns breakdown the complicated metric of economic complexity into two, more 
simple parts. These parts help reveal some qualitative background into how changes in 
democratic institutions have attempted to create the infrastructure and opportunities 
necessary to achieve high economic status. 
2.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage and Intra-Industrial Trade 
The mathematical expression of economic complexity utilizes the idea of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA), accounting for the ubiquitous nature of a good and the 
trade of goods between countries.59 RCA determines whether a country produces a 
prominent share of a particular good. In economic theory, a particular country must 
choose between an array of goods based on a set of capabilities. It is economically more 
beneficial to put more capabilities towards the production of some goods than others, i.e. 
they face an opportunity cost trade-off between goods. A good that a country has RCA in 
is exported from that country at a higher percentage than the good makes up in the world 
share of trade. When countries focus on goods in which they have RCA, they are able to 
trade those goods for goods that other countries have RCA. Therefore, trade between 
those countries is mutually beneficial.  
Poland’s trade breakdown, found in Table 2.1, shows that they have an RCA in 
goods that arise from natural resources, such as wood and food products, and 
manufacturing capabilities, such as consumer goods and transportation. Poland’s large 
availability of arable land explains the high values for natural resource goods. The other 
manufacturing goods require an educated population and other institutional factors.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Hidalgo, Cesar A. and Ricardo Hausmann,“The building blocks of economic 
complexity,” 10570. 
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Table 2.1 Poland: Top Goods with Revealed Comparative Advantage 
Product Group RCA 
Wood 2.18 
Food Products 2.08 
Animal 2.06 
Miscellaneous 1.43 
Plastic or Rubber 1.42 
Metals 1.41 
 
Furthermore, the success of a country’s entrance into a liberalized market can be 
evaluated, according to Gabrisch and Werner, by the improvement of intra-industrial 
trade (IIT) values over time. IIT, shown in Table 2.2, reveals the amount of trade within 
the same sectors of different countries and is a measure of the amount of manufacturing 
value added. A score of 1 is the goal, where countries import and export the same volume 
between industries; this shows a high level of specialization. In the globalizing world, 
and in relatively small markets like the European Union, the total supply chain of a 
product may pass national borders multiple times. This idea of IIT builds upon the idea of 
ECI and RCA because it shows the movement of goods between countries and the 
associated competitiveness of a country’s firms, showing how much firms have 
specialized.
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Table 2.2 Poland's Top Intra-Industrial 
Trade Goods       
Product Type Export Import IIT 
Tin; articles thereof  63,802,766   63,435,361  1.00 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and 
mechanical appliances; parts thereof  25,254,135,302   24,818,808,212  0.99 
Headgear and parts thereof  91,044,030   92,864,465  0.99 
Grand Total 
 
194,461,157,270  
 
189,696,473,787  0.99 
Electrical machinery and equipment and 
parts thereof; sound recorders and 
reproducers; television image and sound 
recorders and reproducers, parts and 
accessories of such articles  23,810,647,760   24,738,853,412  0.98 
Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, 
seat sticks, whips, riding crops; and parts 
thereof  30,468,224   28,722,446  0.97 
Metal; miscellaneous products of base 
metal  1,376,624,247   1,477,358,953  0.96 
Apparel and clothing accessories; not 
knitted or crocheted  2,461,195,239   2,660,289,609  0.96 
Paper and paperboard; articles of paper 
pulp, of paper or paperboard  3,692,732,870   4,018,224,834  0.96 
Fertilizers  768,104,227   837,951,347  0.96 
Carpets and other textile floor coverings  245,003,070   223,744,231  0.95 
 
Of 98 commodities evaluated, 58% of industries experienced intra-industrial trade 
index of over 70%. Overall, all Polish industries experienced an average intra-industrial 
trade of 70%. Trade of this type was the result of efficient sectors that held internal 
economies of scale for their products, ready to sell to international markets. Poland is 
able to access these markets through trade agreements it created or opted into as a 
member of the EU, further showing the economic and political importance of EU 
integration.  
This IIT level is particularly important for Poland and the other countries in this 
group, which, by entering the European Union, entered a highly heterogeneous, industrial 
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market. Gabrish and Werner argue that increasing the economic competitiveness of firms 
coping with the problems acquired from the previous centrally planned system is the 
most difficult task for the transition economies.60 Poland’s success in European economic 
convergence perhaps arises from the performance of privatized businesses, building upon 
the relatively larger portion of semi-private enterprises during the centrally-planned 
economy.61 Poland’s top ten industries with high IIT all require high levels of 
infrastructure and education, as they are largely specialized sectors that deal with the 
production and development of goods, and, therefore, require the support of inclusive, 
democratic institutions to efficiently transfer knowledge.  
This is where the logic of Acemoglu and Robinson meets that of Hidalgo and 
Hausmann. Acemoglu and Robinson offer that, as is the case in Poland, that “inclusive 
economic institutions led to the development of inclusive markets, inducing a more 
efficient allocation of resources, greater encouragement to acquire education and skills, 
and further innovations in technology.”62  These inclusive institutions “allow and 
encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make the 
best use of their talents and skills that enable individuals  to make the choices they 
wish.”63 This theory suggests that the economic institutions are supported by, and in turn 
support, political institutions. Therefore, Poland’s RCA and IIT conditions, which are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Hubert Gabrish & Klaus Werner, “Structural Convergence--Through Industrial 
Policy,” in Remaking Europe ed. Josef M. van Brabant (Lanham, Md: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 
140.  
61 Jan Winiecki, “Crucial Relationship Relationship Between the Privatized Sector 
and the Generic Private Sector in Post-communist Privatization: Determinants of 
Economic Performance,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33.4 (2000): 506. 
62 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 313.  
63 Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, 
Prosperity and Poverty, (London: New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 74. 
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another way of viewing economic complexity, would not be possible without the 
inclusive economic and political climate to support them. The Atlas of Economic 
Complexity notes that the institutions of “[m]arkets and organizations allow the 
knowledge that is held by few to reach many.”64 Consequently, the inclusive, democratic 
institutions Poland has been able to create support the economic situation (markets and 
organizations) necessary to mobilize and encourage the individual and collective 
knowledge to establish high economic complexity.  
Moreover, the success of Poland’s small industrial firms in this market shows a 
movement towards convergence to the EU standard, which is associated with a level of 
democratic and economic success.65 Perhaps the EU is the true force that allows Poland’s 
industry specialization and thus economic complexity. Therefore, Poland’s democracy 
level scores may not be the only guiding force behind the country’s level of economic 
complexity, but it is a predominant one. 
Using Poland as an example, transition economies that present high levels of 
democracy are also those that have the economic potential to diversify their markets and 
connect with the larger world market through a number of industrial avenues. Through 
rigorous economic reform, Poland has been able to develop specialized industries that are 
significant parts of the value chain. Yet, in order to continue to compete economically, as 
Poland has, both private and public spheres must be built on a “wider framework of 
liberty, law, and order, and resultant general trust,” as to retain beneficial trade relations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Hidalgo and Hausmann, The Atlas of Economic Complexity, 15.  
65 Gabrish & Werner, “Structural Convergence,” 140, 151. 
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both inside and outside the EU.66 As seen in the following sections, economic complexity 
in Poland must be supported by complex and diversified democratic institutions. 
2.3 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
As seen in Poland, transition economies must work to rewrite their pasts to create 
inclusive institutions. As Hubert Gabisch and Klaus Werner note, governments must have 
an active role in creating the infrastructure necessary to support active markets with high 
RCA and IIT. The authors state that “adopting the rules of the game” is only one part of 
the equation. Governments must also work to change the “attitude of all economic agents, 
both public and private.”67 Survey data of Poland’s economic and business environment 
reveal the presence of a relatively inclusive economic environment.  
 Conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the World Bank, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) surveys the barriers to success, such as crime and corruption, present in the 
transition economies. As a transition economy recently accepted into the European 
Union, the 2008 survey results compare Polish business’ owner’s responses to those in 
both Western Europe (EU10) and Europe & Central Asia (ECA). In this survey, Poland 
performs predictably well, as the conditions surveyed land between the those reported for 
the EU1068 and the rest of ECA69. The Chart 2.4 shows the particular concerns of 
business directors in Poland compared to the other regions.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Jan Winiecki, “Crucial Relationship,” 510.  
67 Gabrish & Werner, “Structural Convergence,” 151. 
68 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
69 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR 
Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
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 This comparison shows that Polish business leaders are most concerned with the 
regulatory practices of the Polish state, most particularly the tax rate, and the current 
nature of financing a business. Additionally, Jan Winiecki supports the BEEPS findings, 
stating that Polish institutions were more open to the establishment of new private 
businesses, with little institutional resistance. In the whole of the BEEPS review, the 
starkest contrast between Poland, EU10, and the ECA are the differences between official 
and unofficial payments. Polish businesses leaders bemoan official taxes and financial 
barriers to licenses, inspections, etc. but complain relatively little about bribes and other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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unofficial barriers.70 While the level of corruption is not inconsiderable, further 
corruption information later in the BEEPS report and Winiecki’s review of Polish 
regulations show that Poland’s institutions, at least historically, have worked to the 
highest level of economic freedom within CEE and the FSU. 71 
Attempts to minimize corruption and other business concerns are a signal of open, 
organized political structure that democratic institutions are able to provide in Poland. 
While businesses present concerns about macroeconomic instability and tax regimes, 
their confidence in their court systems and the absence of corruption has increased over 
time. Acemoglu and Robinson note that such mechanisms for a virtuous cycle cannot be 
formed immediately. They must be formed over time, as seen here in Poland.72 These 
gradual changes make room for more progressive regulations and adaptations of the 
business culture in the future.  
2.4 OLS 
After observing the economic and business climate of Poland, we return to a 
comparison of factors that affect the level of economic complexity of Poland. An OLS 
model is able to test the relationship and significance of multiple independent factors on a 
dependent variable. As shown in two models in the Table 2.3, there are distinct 
differences in the level of significance when the DI score is included and when it is not. 
When the variable is included, none of the variables are significant. When it is excluded, 
as in not held constant when regressing the other variables with ECI, three variables 
become more significant. Manufacturing value added, urban population, and inflation in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 World Bank Group, “BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008 Poland,” Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey, (January 2010): 6.  
 
71 Jan Winiecki, “Crucial relationship,” 508. 
72Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 318. 
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this model are more significant predictors of economic complexity than democracy, even 
when tested directly with ECI.  
 
Table 2.3 Poland OLS   
 Model 1 Model 2 
Democracy Index Score  -.4748 
(.2419) 
Lagged Democracy Index 
Score 
 -.2815 
(.2892) 
GDP per capita .0012 
(.0006) 
-.0001 
(.00004) 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 3.97e-10 
(1.26e-10) 
-4.88e-12  
(4.33e-12) 
Urban population .00004 
(.00001) 
4.18e-07  
(2.88e-07) 
Inflation -1.035 
(.3404) 
.0534  
(.0252) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP .1314 
(.3412) 
.1890 
(.4706) 
Trade (% of GDP) -.0253 
(.0239) 
-.0071  
(.0071) 
Number of Observations 9 9 
R-squared .8884 .8916 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
 
There are also three interesting caveats to the outcomes of these models. First of 
all, in Model 2, trade (% of GDP) has negative relationships to an increase in the ECI. 
This inverse relationship with trade (% of GDP) is surprising, as ECI score is expected to 
rise as trade increases. Perhaps this comes from an increase in the trading of ubiquitous 
goods that have relatively high RCA, such as wood and food products. High volumes of 
this type of trade could depress the ECI score. 
Secondly, the variable of mineral rents (% of GDP) was included with the 
expectation that the relationship with ECI would be negative but, for both models, it is 
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not. In the case of Poland over the last decade, an increase in the mineral rents (% of 
GDP) actually showed a positive, yet not significant, increase in the ECI score.  
Lastly, in the second model, where the DI score is included, the relationship 
between ECI and DI scores is still negative, as it was when the two variables where 
directly regressed earlier in this chapter. It seems, when looking at a larger scope of 
factors, democracy still has a positive, yet not significant, effect on the ECI score. This is 
contrary to the hypothesis, and speaks to the complexity of transition economies.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Overall, Poland’s committed, enthusiastic push towards full market integration 
was successful in creating and supporting the institutions necessary to create lasting 
democratic and economic performance. A history of gradual creative destruction, 
resulting in both economic reforms, such as semi-privatized businesses, and political 
reforms, such as the push for more democratic policies, allowed Poland to succeed. 
Nevertheless, as evaluations of the democratic climate and faith in the common European 
economic marketplace continue to decline, time will tell whether Poland’s institutions are 
strong enough to weather the storm.  
  
!49 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Ukraine: Stuck in the Grey Zone 
This second case study, Ukraine, is representative of the transition economies in 
the middle range of performance. Ukraine sits between the leading democratic and 
economic figures of the transition economies, such as Poland, and the rent-seeking 
countries, such as Kazakhstan, whose centrally-planned structures have not changed 
much since the fall of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, and the countries in its group, are 
considered “hybrid regimes” by their DI scores, meaning that irregularities prevent 
elections from being called free and fair, there is a lack of civil society, and corruption 
and pressure on opposition parties is widely present.73 Ukraine’s democratic trajectory 
has made pro-democratic strides during its recent Orange Revolution (2005) and 
Euromaidan protests (2014). Due to Ukraine’s economic size and relative success of its 
pro-democracy movements, this case study is a representative of the transition economies 
in the middle of the overall trend. Countries in this group, such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Moldova, have all experienced recent public revolutions, the Rose (2003), Tulip 
(2005), and Grape (2009) revolutions, respectively, and also land in the middle of the 
trend of the transition economies in regards to ECI and DI.  
 The transitional trajectory for all of these countries is much like that of Ukraine. 
While the populace viewed independence as favorable, communism did not end in a 
popular election, as was the case in Poland and other states in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Western Ukrainian nationalist groups, made up mostly of former communist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Economist Intelligence Unit, "Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat," 31. 
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leaders, pushed for independence but were not joined by sympathy in Eastern Ukraine. 
Without enough support to win a democratic majority, the Parliament of Ukraine took the 
first steps towards Ukrainian independence in 1990 before the Soviet Union officially fell 
in August of 1991.74 Therefore, the same incremental steps of greater public political 
alliance against communism and its structures that had occurred in Poland did not occur 
in Ukraine. Due to its strategic position, natural resources, highly educated population, 
and a population highly motivated towards independence, Ukraine had the potential for 
significant growth post-independence.75 Unfortunately, the country’s top-down 
transitional development meant that many of the elites, as well as their structures of 
power, remained in place and true economic and political reform was barely considered.76 
As Ilya Prizel remarks: “Ukraine lacked both an elite committed to democratic reforms 
and liberal economics and a fully developed, capable democratic alternative.”77 
Therefore, despite Ukraine’s potential at the end of the Soviet Union, in practice, 
transitional reforms did not prove successful in creating adequate political or economic 
institutions to propel the country to success along the lines of its European neighbors.  
 Additionally, the gradual reform measures that were taken at the beginning of 
transition led to selling off of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is the transition 
economies’ most significant structural challenge where the initial transition phases lacked 
the adequate civil-service infrastructure (i.e. inclusive institutions) necessary to guide this 
movement of businesses from the public to the private. Many of the new owners of SOEs 
did not, and even still do not, have an interest in maximizing the revenues and benefits to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 25. 
75 Gorobets, “An independent Ukraine,” 94. 
76 Anders, “Communism and Its Demise,” 25-26. 
77 Ilya Prizel “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism,” 344. 
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society as a whole.78 Without the inclusive institutions to support an open economic 
market, the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) led to a forming of an oligarchic elite, 
whose wealth and political connections dominated every aspect of Ukraine. This hasty 
transition from the command economy shows the link between troubled democratic 
institutions and declining performance and competitiveness of a country’s industries. 
In context, economic complexity dipped after independence until 1995. 
Meanwhile in Poland, immediate growth in small private businesses was able to 
compensate for the immediate decline of remaining SOEs. With large SOEs still intact at 
the beginning of transition, the same cannot be said for Ukraine because, in an 
unsuccessful transition, the recovery phase was different. First of all, SOE decline was 
slower, and the generic private sector had few incentives to grow, all of which lengthened 
the SOE transfer process. The result was an overall slower economy.79 Economic 
performance increased after 1996, but the following years were still turbulent. ECI fell 
significantly in the years preceding the most recent pro-democracy protests, the 
Euromaidan demonstrations of 2014. 
 At the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had high potential for growth and, in 
1991, the state set out to create and sustain a variety of welfare state programs but failed 
to maintain them into the present period. This lack of sufficient public institutions 
diminished confidence in both democracy and the government as well as limited the 
capabilities (education, transportation, etc.) that support a complex economy.80  
3.1 Economic Complexity Index score by Democracy Index score 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 Gabrish & Werner, “Structural Convergence,” 154. 
79 Jan Winiecki, “Crucial Relationship,” 513. 
80 Gorobets, “An independent Ukraine,” 94. 
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 As shown in Chart 3.1, there is a general trend downwards of both the ECI and DI 
scores over the decade, with exception of a jump between 2014-2016. Following the 
general hypothesis, changes in the DI score are followed by minor changes in the ECI 
score. Furthermore, the negative slope of both variables from 2006-2014 reflects the poor 
economic and democratic situation even a decade into transition. It also follows the 
theory that DI and ECI are closely tied together. What is less explainable is the drastic 
fall of ECI in 2012 followed by an even more drastic rise in 2015, all without much 
alteration in the DI score. Economic behavior in Ukraine defies the patterns of both the 
causation direction suggested in the hypothesis and the trends present in the other two 
case studies. Most notably, the ECI score increases drastically before DI improves in 
2015. This relationship could be explained by increased international engagement after 
the 2014 Euromaidan protests. Without clear evidence, this is just speculation. 
Furthermore, because the two scores are based on fairly different ranges, the minutiae of 
the trends are easier to see in Chart 3.2, which maps the amount of change between the 
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two variables. Here, there is actually a turbulent, opposing relationship between the two 
variables from 2006 until 2011. Beginning in 2011, the scores begin to sync in the 
amount of change. Most notably, in 2014, the year of the Euromaidan, both scores 
converge in growth and begin to move together, perhaps further united by the protests.  
 
 These two phenomena bring into question the principles of both the predictive 
quality of the ECI and the hypothesis that greater democracy over time leads to greater 
economic diversity. First of all, Hidalgo and Hausmann claim that the ECI is predictive, 
but Ukraine’s performance is greatly varied over time and does not stick to a perceivable 
trend, as Poland and Kazakhstan’s ECI scores over time do. Secondly, the ECI score 
seems to move almost independently of the DI score, with the exception of data points 
after 2014. Nevertheless, even though this ECI score has decreased over the span of 
Ukraine’s independence, the regression of Ukraine’s ECI and DI scores show that there is 
still a moderate, positive correlation between ECI and DI scores for Ukraine. 
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As seen in the disruption point of 2014 in the charts above, political movements 
in recent years have brought radical moments of change to the country. The first of these 
occurred in 2004. Historically, despite favorable initial conditions for a fully democratic 
society, the first two presidents, Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leionid Kuchma 
(1994) continually negotiated power between the presidency and the legislative body, the 
Verkhovna Rada. Even after the first Ukrainian constitution was created in 1996, 
Kuchma still continued to whittle away legislative power by pushing for the legislative 
body to be split into two parts. In response to this, a popular uprising over the validity of 
the 2004 election, called the Orange Revolution, caused the constitution to be rewritten 
and established a “parliamentary-presidential” republic, ascertaining a more equitable 
split of executive power.81 In this way, these revolutions have allowed Ukraine and others 
to experience a phenomenon called “creative destruction,” or an exchange of the old for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Minakov and Rojanky, “Democracy in Ukraine,” 2. 
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the new that is typical in economic or technical change.82 Centralized power systems, 
such as oligarchies, attempt to prevent creative destruction in order to prevent a loss of 
power.  
Once it is achieved, it lowers the stakes of further, even minimal, creative 
destruction. These continuous changes build a “gradual virtuous cycle” that is less 
threatening to elites and builds inclusive institutions on stable, not uncharted ground.83 
Evidence of this gradual virtual cycle is present in the success of reforms of the 
Euromaidan, or “Revolution of Dignity,” of 2013-2014 that reinstated the 2004 
constitution after pro-Russian president Yanukovich disrupted the reforms of 2004 
through corruption and political influence. These protests, which were led “from-below,” 
began a rebuilding of civil society and the waning of traditional elite-driven parties. As 
seen in the charts, the impressive rise in democracy following this period was 
accompanied by an improvement in economic complexity. As the momentum of the 
Euromaidan continues, increased levels of democracy and subsequently increased levels 
of economic performance are expected.  
3.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage & Intra-Industrial Trade 
 Before discussing the breakdown of economic industries through RCA and IIT, it 
must be noted that Poland and Ukraine entered into their respective transition periods 
with very different economic compositions. As seen in Chart 1.1, Poland had one of the 
highest economic complexities of the transition economies at the start of the transition, 
while Ukraine began with significantly less economic complexity, in the middle of the 
group. While the ECI of each has increased since, they still remain in the same relative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 84. 
83 Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 318. 
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ranks. This is to reiterate, that all the transition economies did not begin with the exact 
same level of economic complexity, and differences have grown significantly over time 
and have increased economic inequality as well.  
 While Poland had existed as an independent entity throughout the communist 
period, building industries to support only itself, Ukraine was one small piece of a much 
larger Soviet unit. Furthermore, due to the lack of incentives within central planning in 
CEE, firms in these countries pushed towards self-sufficiency and development of 
processing industries in order to prevent against supply shocks from either firms not 
meeting their quotas or other countries becoming disinterested in trade.84 Subsequently, 
the economic capabilities developed in Ukraine were instead meant to support a large 
economic system, the USSR, and were less able to enable the country to be self-sufficient 
into independence. These differences between Poland and Ukraine highlight another 
larger transitional obstacle of the countries of the FSU (excluding the Baltics) that goes 
beyond political institutional structures: the issue of moving out of a larger economic unit 
and into economic independence.  
Moreover, the composition of trading industries in Ukraine has not significantly 
changed since the beginning of independence, partially due to only marginally inclusive 
institutions, as reflected in trade outcomes of revealed comparative advantage and intra-
industrial trade. As key aspect of the ECI, RCA shows a country’s economic capabilities 
by revealing its most efficient and productive industries. As shown in the Table 3.1, 
Ukraine mainly specializes in goods that arise from natural resources, such as vegetables 
and raw materials. This explains Ukraine’s relatively low ECI score, as all of these goods 
are fairly ubiquitous. They do not require the same institutional factors as a more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Berend. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery, 192. 
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complex good, such as transportation, in which Poland has RCA. These values mostly 
serve as a confirmation that there are institutional problems, such as the inefficient 
distribution of power, that have not allowed Ukraine to achieve the same economic 
results as its Western neighbors, most notably Poland.85 Under such systems, there is 
unfair competition in the way construction projects and land distribution are conducted.86 
Furthermore, due to the lack of transparency and developmental opportunities, there is 
economic insecurity. Although prices are comparable to countries in the region, wages 
and pensions are low. This leads to heavy emigration from the country for work, 
sometimes illegally and often open to exploitation. Additionally, young people leaving 
the villages leave rural communities with few developmental opportunities, due to a 
remaining low-skilled or aged population. 
Table 3.1 Ukraine: Top Goods with Revealed Comparative Advantage 
Product Group RCA 
Vegetable 8.5 
Minerals 5.82 
Metals 3.38 
 Raw materials 2.68 
Wood 2.14 
 Intermediate goods 2.04 
Food Products 2.03 
 
 Furthermore, IIT dives deeper into the concept of ECI, conceptualizing how 
goods in the same industry are traded between countries to add value. The top IIT sectors, 
as shown in the Table 3.2, are a mixed group of complex and simple goods. This shows 
that Ukraine has varied capabilities, from industrial products, like electrical machinery 
and aircraft parts that have intricate supply chains, as well as ubiquitous natural resource !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Sergei Meleshchuk, “Evoliutsiia ekonomicheskoi clozhnosti Ukrainy: beg na 
meste.” Ekonomicheskaia Pravda. Last modified January 19, 2016.  
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goods, such as iron and fruit preparations. Nevertheless, only 29% of Ukrainian 
industries experience IIT of over 70%, and the national IIT average is only 42%. This 
means that few Ukrainian industries experience economies of scale and are not truly 
competitive in the international market.  
Table 3.2 Ukraine's Top Intra-Industrial Trade 
Goods       
Product Type Export Import IIT 
Iron or steel articles  689,793,623   647,206,673  0.97 
Commodities not specified according to kind  186,143,899   205,060,628  0.95 
Explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; 
pyrophoric alloys; certain combustible preparations  11,359,437   10,148,448  0.94 
Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts 
of plants  140,272,386   110,802,375  0.88 
Copper and articles thereof  74,682,303   57,818,353  0.87 
Natural, cultured pearls; precious, semi-precious 
stones; precious metals, metals clad with precious 
metal, and articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin  51,957,816   67,314,847  0.87 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  321,815,988   430,223,216  0.86 
Cocoa and cocoa preparations  162,209,101   217,081,666  0.86 
Apparel and clothing accessories; knitted or 
crocheted  107,334,130   160,723,766  0.80 
Umbrellas, sun umbrellas, walking-sticks, seat 
sticks, whips, riding crops; and parts thereof  5,864,852   3,909,784  0.80 
Electrical machinery and equipment and parts 
thereof; sound recorders and reproducers; television 
image and sound recorders and reproducers, parts 
and accessories of such articles  2,076,689,751  
 
3,203,224,585  0.79 
 
Unlike Poland, Ukraine’s economy has failed to converge to the EU norm. 
Continuing to specialize in these “low-quality products,” and the economic structures that 
produce them may result in diverging economic structures between the EU and Ukraine. 
EU nations, which experience high IIT as well as economic complexity, also tend to be 
richer and more prosperous. Moreover, by adding only a small share of value to products, 
Ukraine may find themselves in a “technology gap,” unable to catch up economically to 
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EU members.87 Gorobets argues that the economic and technological failures exhibited in 
the above RCA and IIT data result from a “deep socio-political-economic crisis in 
Ukraine,” via 1) a weak institutional base, unable to manage the environment, education, 
or civil society, 2) a poor understanding, from both the government and the public, of 
sustainable development, and 3) an “absence of clear, consistent goals and specific well-
developed national programs for sustainable development.”88 While the number of 
students with higher-education (tertiary degrees) is high, Ukraine’s lack of specialized 
researchers arises from poor institutional management in key industrial sectors. This 
means that Ukraine often falls behind in specializing goods and has significantly less 
purchasing power.89 Thus, as Sergei Meleshuk argues, the Ukrainian government can use 
the country’s regionally lagging ECI scores to decide how and where best to tackle the 
aforementioned socio-political-economic crisis and to right the path towards new 
technological production.90  
Additionally, as Gabrisch and Werner note, lack of access to adequate trade 
agreements, particularly the European Union, may have magnified Ukraine’s poor ECI 
scores.91 Ukraine’s failure to democratize and ascend to the European Union, and the 
access to international markets through FTAs that come with membership, means that 
Ukrainian industries have fewer opportunities to trade than their western counterparts. 
Even from outside the EU perspective, Ukraine failed to create a well-centralized 
governing body or create strong economic ties with the CIS, a trading union that could !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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88 Gorobets, “An independent Ukraine,” 99, 102. 
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90 Sergei Meleshchuk, “Evoliutsiia ekonomicheskoi clozhnosti Ukrainy: beg na 
meste.” Ekonomicheskaia Pravda. Last modified January 19, 2016.  
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have been tightly connected the economies of the FSU. These failures to maintain 
advantageous trade partnerships further diminishes already low organizational 
capabilities. For these reasons, Ukrainian industries have difficulty specializing, as shown 
by the country’s poor volume of goods with RCA and lackluster IIT levels. 
3.3 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
 Local business culture, which is a reflection of the society at large, also affects 
how firms operate in international markets. This is implicitly reflected in the both the DI 
and ECI scores. Ukraine’s BEEPS report compares the country to the Northern Former 
Soviet Union (FSUN)92 and ECA. From this comparison, businesses in Ukraine and 
Poland have similar concerns--taxes and corruption. Ukraine’s concerns most closely 
follow the trends of the FSUN with more disparity between the ECA region as a whole, 
especially in 2008.  
It is important to note the time of these reports. Almost all of Ukraine’s business 
concerns actually increase between the two time periods. This is significant because the 
Orange Revolution (2004) occurred between the two surveys. As these were pro-
democracy movements, it could be expected that Ukrainian confidence in their business 
environment and state institutions would increase after the protests. These results show 
the opposite. Based on this simple review, it is difficult to say whether or not conditions 
actually worsened or simply awareness of the faults in the systems throughout the FSU 
grew over time. 
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Nevertheless, in both time periods, Ukrainian firms reported a higher percentage 
of unofficial payments for services, such as customs fees and court bribes, than both other 
groups. The Soviet system gave rise to these still-active informal payment networks. The 
uneasy transition of Ukraine that failed to fully prepare or equip citizens for a pro-market 
system, also resulted in a government that was arguably too permissive during the initial 
stages of transition. This lack of parallelism has resulted in “corruption, crime, collusion 
between power and businesses, … and further power-society antagonism.”93 These are 
barriers to a firm’s success and are markers of inefficiencies of the centralized state. This 
may also cause successful foreign firms to choose not to do business in Ukraine.  
Despite the strength of informal payment networks, organizations that build a 
more fully-formed civil society, such as a free press and NGO development, have been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Gorobets, “An independent Ukraine,” 99. 
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growing in recent years, especially after the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the 
Euromaidan of 2014. In some ways, the popular revolutions themselves have served as 
institutions to gradually build civil society and increase democratic attitudes.  For 
example, elections in 2006 brought new political fervor but failed to attract young people, 
leaving the government stuck between proposed new ways and the remaining Soviet 
ways.94 The “civil society organizations” (CSO) that formed around this time helped to 
organize young people and form legislation and other documents to “[advocate] for 
deeper and faster democratic reforms” from 2004 on and especially in the power vacuum 
left after the 2014 protests.95 To increase the gains made by these movements, social 
groups in Ukraine must continue to effectively organize networks, promote leadership 
development, and protect democratic rights. Such civil society is vital to the improvement 
of inclusive institutions and, by extension, the level of democracy, in Ukraine. This is the 
backbone of sustainable economic development in transition economies. In the meantime, 
the prevalence of corruption and social inequity in the business community shows that 
Ukraine, as well as the countries in this middle group, still have much progress to make 
in terms of transforming both their formal and informal structures in order to allow a free, 
prosperous, and fair economic and political system.  
3.4 OLS 
The same variables in the Polish case were used to test the economic factors in 
Ukraine. Here, in both models shown in Table 3.3, none of the variables resulted in 
significant trends. Nevertheless, interesting, unexpected trends did arise in these 
regressions. The relationships between ECI and GDP per capita and urban population !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Ibid., 101. 
95 Minakov and Rojanky, “Democracy in Ukraine,” 9. 
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were negative, meaning that as each of these independent variables increases, the ECI 
decreased. Overarching scholarship concludes that richer nations have higher economic 
performance and accompanying ECI scores. This output goes against the idea that, when 
there is more capital available per citizen, there should be more opportunity for economic 
success and knowledge added to traded goods. 
Table 3.3 Ukraine OLS   
 Model 1 Model 2 
Democracy Index Score  .3054 
(.2056) 
Lagged Democracy Index 
Score 
 .1256 
(.1187) 
GDP per capita -.0005 
(.0005) 
-.0005 
(.0004) 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 1.12e-10 
(8.32e-11) 
1.03e-11  
(2.61e-11) 
Urban population -2.65e-07  
(5.80e-07) 
-4.38e-07 
(6.76e-07) 
Inflation -.0025 
(.0065) 
-.0028 
(.0039) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP -.0676  
(.0797) 
-.0123 
(.0620) 
Trade (% of GDP) .0109 
(.0143) 
-.0001 
(-.0001) 
Number of Observations 9 9 
R-squared .7763 0.7881 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
 
 
  Additionally, in Model 1, where democracy is excluded, the manufacturing value 
added is the most significant factor, as shown in Table 3.3. When democracy is 
introduced in Model 2, it is the most significant factor determining the ECI score. Based 
on the mechanics of the ECI and the economic picture depicted thus far, this is to be 
expected. Overall, these mixed results of the OLS regression mirrors the democratically 
mixed status of Ukraine. For these countries in the middle, there is no clear factor that 
determines their economic success, at least in terms of ECI.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Ukraine shows, in the last decade, gradual changes of both DI and ECI scores 
with unifying disruptions brought about during times of creative destruction. Despite a 
lagging economic system, Ukraine has become a model for how bottom-up movements 
can help build strong civil society networks. These networks, over time, allow the 
adequate distribution of power and knowledge necessary to improve economic 
complexity. In this way, Ukraine’s continued insistence on the building of more inclusive 
institutions through a gradual virtuous cycle is expected to result in further improving 
ECI scores into the future.  
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Chapter 4 
Kazakhstan: The Slow Churn of a Resource Economy 
In the realm of the transition economies, Kazakhstan represents the group of post-
Soviet rentier states. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are marked 
by a high dependence on natural resources and very limited democratic structures. 
Because of their limited range of economic activities, all of these countries fall at the 
lower spectrum of the ECI. Additionally, they are all considered to be “authoritarian 
regimes,” meaning that elections (if they occur) are not free and fair, there is a disregard 
for civil liberties, media is state-owned, and any democratic institutions have little 
substance.96 These countries were the most reluctant to change during the initial 
transitional period and, therefore, have experienced little structural or social transition 
following the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Kazakhstan’s independence was practically accidental, as it became a country 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, not by means of popular political movement. This 
passive independence meant that nothing really changed in terms of governmental 
structure. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 
almost immediately became president and other communist leaders from the Soviet time 
remained in their positions of power. The first constitution included factors that put 
checks on elite power and signaled a democratic future, but the speedy annulment of 
these reforms showed a return towards authoritarianism. In this case, authoritarianism 
was tolerated because it provided the stability necessary to attract foreign support and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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investment. Elites found that Western talk of democracy and human rights did not result 
in any sanctions or pressure when democracy and human rights were not protected.97 The 
need for immediate security combined with the lack of national and international 
incentives to democratically transition meant that Nazarbayev and the circles of elites 
surrounding him cemented themselves into the political and economic fabric of 
Kazakhstan.  
In turn, a mix of the traditional clan structure with that of former leaders of the 
Communist party creates Kazakhstan’s static political structure. In the context of 
Kazakhstan and the other countries in this group, this phenomenon is called 
“neopatrimonialism,” and forms the non-transparent network of patronage that 
characterizes post-Soviet rentier states.98 Hossein Mahdavy originated the term “rentier 
state,” to describe states that “[receive] substantial rents from foreign actors, be they 
individuals, enterprises or governments.”99 The money governments earn through rent-
seeking behavior frees them from the responsibility of accounting for the needs of the 
people because the people’s tax revenue does not fund the government. Instead, the rent 
funds funnel into socially unproductive patron-client networks that inappropriately 
allocate resource wealth rather than create new wealth.100 These activities, in the short !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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term, provide political and economic security because elites are able to stay in power and 
unproductive industries are protected from market pressures. Nevertheless, all of this is 
unsustainable in the long run.101  
Nazarbayev's sole rise to executive power from the Soviet period into 
independence meant (and still means) that he is the sole guarantor of political power and 
stability. Circling Nazarbayev is his family, followed by companions, then by national 
business and regional elites.102 These groups hold predominant power in Kazakhstan, 
which means they have control over all aspects of life and have few incentives to share or 
diversify their power and subsequent wealth. Although the specific makeup or “brand” of 
political power changed as communism came to an end in Kazakhstan, the extractive 
nature of the institutions and the vicious cycle they create did not change.103 
Consequently, elites effectively consolidate political power in a way that prevents 
substantial economic or political reform, which could destabilize their power. 
Furthermore, as Franke et al. remark, “[t]he sudden discontinuation of the system of 
central planning after the collapse of the Soviet Union had a negative impact on the 
production capacities of the Kazakh economy.” Elites’ consolidation of economic power 
to be wielded as a political force has further weakened the country’s production 
capabilities because inefficient industries are able to remain. The continuation of these 
negative impacts of transition are seen in Kazakhstan’s ECI and DI scores over time. 
4.1 Economic Complexity Score by Democracy Index Score !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Like Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s ECI and DI scores have steadily decreased in the past 
decade, with the exception of a drastic uptick in ECI between 2014 and 2015. This was 
the result of an internal push, in response to declining oil prices, to transform industrial 
policy towards more diversified economic activities and a reduction on the dependence 
on oil.104 Before this internal change, there is a small, though present, accompanying 
trend upward in DI during the years (2012-2014). Again, the magnitude change makes 
the trends even more clear. When the amount of change is evaluated in the magnitude 
change chart (Chart 3.2) a massive increase in ECI score follows an increase in the DI 
between 2011 and 2012 with a plateau between 2012 and 2013. Here, as was the case in 
Poland, there is a time-delayed ECI score response in the change of DI score. Only here, 
the magnitude of change in the two variables are less equal in value (amount of change in 
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one factor does not result in the same amount of change in the other) than in Poland’s 
case. 
 
Not shown in the charts above is the sharp increase in ECI that occured between 
1992 and 1998 before beginning its general decline downward. This follows Franke et 
al.’s and Acemoglu and Robinson’s claim that rentier states, i.e. extractive institutions, 
can be prosperous initially, but are unsustainable. The trends also follows the claim that 
the ECI is predictive; as ECI scores continue to decrease, it becomes more difficult to 
improve the industrial capacity to compete internationally. These low scores arise from 
the trade with few countries of products that are highly ubiquitous, such as natural 
resources. The post-Soviet Rentier states’ abundance of oil and other natural resources 
add volatility to economy output values and “may become a vicious circle” because they 
lack of incentives to diversify the economy.105  
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 Furthermore, there is a fairly flat, weakly significant, positive correlation between 
ECI and DI for Kazakhstan, shown in Chart 4.3. This helps to support the hypothesis that 
the more authoritarian a country is the less economic complexity a country will have. 
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s behavior falls into the classification Acemoglu and Robinson 
call the “vicious cycle” that is formed by extractive institutions, as such institutions locate 
power within a narrow elite with few restrictions on that power. These scholars claim that 
such extractive political institutions accompany extractive economic institutions.106 As 
stated above, the Nazarbayev clan and other business elites form the hands to which 
Kazakhstan (and by extension Nazarbayev) narrowly places political and economic 
power. The vicious cycle continues because the wealth and economic power funneled to 
elites can then, in turn, buy political power. Extractive political and economic institutions 
dominate all the countries in this group because they created initial stability for the 
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Central Asian region, which lacked broad “bottom-up” democratic or free-market 
movements.107 Unrestricted elite power actively limits economic institutions that could 
create incentives for economic progress and hence redistribute power away from the 
inner circle, diminishing the power of the extractive institution.108 Furthermore, the 
uneven development that arises from post-Soviet rentier states’ extractive institutions, in 
both resource and non-resource sectors, supports slow economic reform and even further 
authoritarianism. RCA and IIT analysis shows a more in-depth image of these clan-
supported economic institutions and how Kazakhstan’s political and economic factors 
work together.  
4.2 Revealed Comparative Advantage and Intra-Industrial Trade 
As expected, Kazakhstan is most efficient in its export of raw materials, shown in 
Chart 4.1. The country has the highest RCA in fuels, raw materials, and minerals and 
only a narrow advantage in the production of intermediate goods and vegetables. Despite 
the differences in their economic institutions, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have similar 
industries with RCA. Nevertheless, this spread is highly characteristic of enduring 
extractive institutions. High complexity goods, which require inclusive, redistributive 
institutions to arise, such as machinery & electricity and transportation, do not appear in 
Kazakhstan’s RCA breakdown. Unsurprisingly, Kazakhstan’s main good with RCA is 
fuel. Franke et al note that the “post-Soviet states in the Caspian Region are not only the 
future resource markets; they also show the highest level of external rent income amongst 
former Soviet republics.”109 Kazakhstan's group of post-communist rentier states 
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experience natural resource rents between 40 and 90% of GDP.110 Kazakhstan actually 
has the smallest rent share of GDP for the group. Nevertheless, this high share of oil 
resources, which signals high outside demand, often causes non-oil sectors to contract 
and to lose firm competitiveness; this is known as the “Dutch disease.” The continuation 
of this pattern, which causes socially unproductive, undemocratic activities, is called a 
resource curse.111 Kazakhstan’s high volume of oil reserves, low economic complexity, 
and low democracy scores signal that the country is experiencing a resource curse. 
 Kazakhstan’s oil reserves did initiate economic growth, but now the main 
challenge is channeling knowledge and resources towards sustained growth. An Asian 
Development Bank study shows that continued reliance on Kazakhstan’s resource sectors 
cannot produce as much growth as in the past or allow Kazakhstan to reach its full 
economic growth potential.112  The resource curse makes the process of changing 
economic policy more difficult. Moreover, channeling sustained growth now depends on 
deep institutional transformation because “long term growth requires fundamental 
changes in the way that the society and polity is organized around economic issues.”113 
Because of Nazarbayev's clan’s consolidation of power, fundamental changes are not 
apparent under the current system and are only possible under conditions of a critical 
juncture.
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Table 4.1 Kazakhstan: Top Goods with Revealed Comparative Advantage 
Product Group RCA 
Fuels 5.42 
 Raw materials 4.88 
Minerals 4.64 
Metals 3.26 
 Intermediate goods 1.57 
Vegetable 1.02 
 
Looking into industries that actively trade with other countries to develop goods, 
only a few Kazakh industries conduct substantial intra-industrial trade. The industries that 
exhibit the most IIT are fish & crustaceans, food industries, ships, and wool, shown in 
Table 4.2. All goods, with the exception of ships, have very simple supply chains. 
Compared to Poland and Ukraine, Kazakhstan’s industries participate in little IIT, as only 
15% of experience IIT value over 70%. Therefore, Kazakhstan is not adding significant 
specialized value to international goods. Institutions that produce innovation and broad 
investment into the populous, and thus result in a stronger private sector as well as human 
capital development, are the source of such specialization.114 Conversely, 
underinvestment in the industrial capacities of the state, not investment in innovation, is a 
further characteristic of a rentier-state.115 As an extractive institution, the Kazakh 
government has incentives to limit economic and, thus, democratic innovation.  
Kazakhstan and the other post-Soviet rentier states built their resource policies 
from scratch, using knowledge from Soviet economic theory, with little awareness of 
more modern industrial policy. As a result, the supported economic policy at the 
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beginning of transition believed that “natural resources raise the rate of investment and 
imports, thereby necessitating and accelerating a restructuring of the economy, as well as 
strengthening social security, therefore easing the social costs of unemployment.”116 
Kazakhstan’s lack of substantial, sustained economic improvement in the last 27 years, 
combined with increasing authoritarianism within each country, disprove this theory. 
Although it is possible to rely on natural resource extraction while building sustainable 
institutions, natural resource extraction can also undermine democratic institutions.117 
Rodrik argues that natural resources come with benefits, such as short-term political 
stability and economic ignition, as well as disadvantages, such as the lack of economic 
complexity and democracy necessary to prevent instability and shocks. In this case, 
Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet rentier states reformed (privatized) enough to get 
foreign investment.118 The institutions, meant to invite and economic improvement, did 
quite the opposite. These institutions, in funneling oil-rents towards the elites and away 
from the populace, failed to create a fair, transparent political or economic environment 
that could facilitate the hoped-for market success.
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Table 4.2 Kazakhstan's Top Intra-Industrial Trade Goods       
Product Type Export Import IIT 
Fish and crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic 
invertebrates  50,902,864   50,655,222  1.00 
Food industries, residues and wastes thereof; prepared 
animal fodder  54,416,934   62,687,773  0.93 
Ships, boats and floating structures  69,627,809   55,559,737  0.89 
Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair yarn and 
woven fabric  3,907,563   3,070,421  0.88 
Silk  324,766   435,580  0.85 
Fertilizers  45,036,582   66,117,157  0.81 
Ores, slag and ash 
 
1,193,597,789  
 
694,568,515  0.74 
Aluminium and articles thereof  382,485,269  
 
216,306,048  0.72 
Commodities not specified according to kind  17,973,283   32,017,735  0.72 
Pulp of wood or other fibrous cellulosic material; 
recovered (waste and scrap) paper or paperboard  4,514,960   8,419,117  0.70 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes  110,963,895  
 
209,736,179  0.69 
 
4.3 Business and Enterprise Environment and Performance Survey  
 The BEEPS report on Kazakhstan, presented in Chart 4.4, helps to reveal how 
businesses in the country operate and respond to elite control and extractive economic 
institutions. The report, as with Ukraine, compares the business environment to the ECA 
and FSUN. Much like Poland and Ukraine, Kazakh businesses find taxes and corruption 
to be the most significant problems for conducting business. As shown in the Chart 4.4, 
these concerns increased over time. Businesses’ concerns with the skills and education of 
workers is more severe than the ECA while they find labor regulations to be far less of an 
issue than both the ECA and the FSUN. Favorable labor regulations combined with an 
authoritarian regime might be a lingering article of Soviet institutions, which aimed for 
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“economic democracy first and political democracy last” and provided many employment 
benefits.119 
 
 While not directly addressed in the chart, BEEPS report later shows that firms in 
Kazakhstan also paid a greater share of unofficial payments than both the ECA and the 
FSUN.120 Over time fewer firms reported unofficial payments, but the payments, as a 
share of annual sales, did increase between 2005 and 2008. In fact, Kazakh firms reported 
an average bribe payment that was around twice as much as the average payments 
reported by the ECA and the FSUN. In the rent-oriented world of Kazakhstan, incomes 
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not earned through work per se, but instead are results of rent opportunities. This 
mentality leads to widespread corruption through patron-client networks.121  
These evaluations again follow Acemoglu and Robinson’s idea of extractive 
institutions. High levels of corruption, especially when power is held by a small elite, 
creates barriers to economic improvement because it raises the average operating costs 
and requires businesses to exist only within the limit allowed by the ruling group: the 
state. Truly extractive institutions, where political power is held in the hands of those 
who benefit from the extraction, make corruption difficult to eliminate because the roots 
of corruption remain fundamentally intact within the government organization.122 
Additionally, this complicated informal business environment deters international firms, 
which might be competitive innovators, from entering the market.  
In addition, widespread corruption creates a mindset that values connections and 
luck over effort and participation. This mentality fundamentally questions the power and 
success of capitalist markets and, even, democratic institutions. Moreover, the failure of 
the post-Soviet rentier states to diversify economically, to obstruct corruption networks, 
and to administer vital economic development damages sustainable socio-economic and 
civil society transformation. This lack of socio-economic development plays into the 
broadly-held social beliefs about the viability of capitalist markets. Not only has the 
political sphere not developed into a democratic, advocating body, but the populace has 
also not gone through an accompanying transition of democratic thought in order to fully 
hold the Kazakh government accountable. The manipulation of oil-rents and a non-taxed 
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populous means that civil society simply lacks the incentives to fully organize itself.123 In 
Kazakhstan, the mentality towards the government has remained largely intact since the 
Soviet era, with citizens not willing to speak out against leaders, not having the adequate 
information to do so, and not being motivated to do so, especially if their basic needs are 
met through state benefits.124  
Part of this lack of social transition comes through the lack of free media, which 
could aid in democratic and economic reform. Unfortunately, authoritarian regimes 
understand the importance of free media to the success of popular revolutions because 
they allow threats to “economic and political institutions [to be] widely known and 
resisted” and try to suspend it as much as possible.125 Without a voice to speak to the 
contrary, Kazakh government and business leaders can create an illusion of economic 
diversification while paying off important public groups.126 Where national opposition 
parties have failed to create a strong civil system, a small number of NGOs, mainly in 
large cities, have been able to create initiatives and dialogue that create avenues for 
greater transparency.127  
NGOs and other civil society organization help to build a strong social society, 
which in turn helps to protect against economic and social damages during times of 
uncertainty. Drastic changes in oil prices have a massive impact in post-Soviet rentier 
states because so much of the society is built around the backbone of the oil industry. 
Yet, oil revenues will not last forever. In other countries, such as Poland, the effects of 
uncertainty are buffered by a diversified private sector that strong civil society, as seen in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Di Tella, “Kazakhstan: Institutions,” 74. 
124 Franke et al., "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as post-Soviet rentier states,” 133. 
125 Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 325, 461. 
126 Di Tella, “Kazakhstan: Institutions,” 70. 
127 Franke et. al, "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as post-Soviet rentier states,” 131 
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competitive, intra-industrial trade data and relatively stable ECI scores over time. For 
these reasons, Rodrik finds that democracy, built by exchange of ideas in a free media 
and the civil support of NGOs, is “the most important institution of conflict 
management.”128 As the ECI and trade data have outlined above, autocratic post-Soviet 
rentier states have the ability to ignite growth, but the inclusive institutions of 
democracies have the diversifying power to protect and sustain the economic system 
when it comes under stress.  
4.4 OLS  
 The qualitative and quantitative measures above outline why resource wealth and 
autocracy have created the economic situation that exists today in Kazakhstan. The OLS 
model, shown in Table 3.4, continues the analysis by showing the statistical relationship 
between various development factors and the resulting ECI score. The same variables as 
were used in the previous case studies were used to test Kazakhstan’s data. Results in 
Model 1 are highly significant. In both models the urban population has a positive 
correlation to ECI. This may result from the clustering of people and businesses in urban 
areas and away from border regions.129 GDP per capita has a negative relationship to ECI 
in Model 1 but has a insignificant, positive relationship in Model 2. In the broader sense, 
both of these results are unusual because greater GDP and democracy is typically 
associated with greater economic performance.  
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128 Rodrik, “Notes on an Industrial Strategy for Kazakhstan: The Growth Challenge,” 
50. 
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Table 4.3 Kazakhstan OLS 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Democracy Index Score  -.3495  
(1.147) 
Lagged Democracy Index 
Score 
 2.473 
(.0005) 
GDP per capita **-.0044  
(.0002) 
.0004  
(.0004) 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) **8.37e-10  
(5.89e-11) 
2.54e-10  
(8.08e-10) 
Urban population ***4.92e-06  
(1.41e-07) 
7.75e-07  
(3.98e-07) 
Inflation **.0582 
(.0036) 
.0222  
(.0248) 
Mineral rents (% of GDP **-1.513 
(.0963) 
.1441  
(.3394) 
Trade (% of GDP) **.0813  
(.0033) 
-.0169  
(.0178) 
Number of Observations 9 9 
R-squared 0.9996 0.9350 
Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p< .001 
 
The most surprising result is that when democracy is added to the regression with 
the other variables, there is actually a weak, negative relationship between democracy 
and ECI. There is a positive relationship between the two variables have a positive 
correlation when the compared directly. The r-squared value is also very high in both 
models. This relationship is less significant than the other factors. It seems that, whenever 
a matrix of industrial and developmental factors are included in the regression, the result 
goes against both the hypothesis and the simplified regression.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Kazakhstan has not been able to fully economically transition due to the 
persistence of authoritarianism, an extractive institution that destroys the “incentives 
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needed for people to save, invest, and innovate.”130 The transformation of Kazakhstan's 
political and economic situation can only come through a critical juncture that would 
allow for widespread awareness of and reeducation towards corruption. The government 
would have to go directly against the will of the people in a way that was irreconcilable 
to create such a moment of possible change. Most likely this process would take years of 
gradual change to build a robust, legitimate democracy, built on inclusive institutions. 
This gradual process could begin with a state-sponsored diversification project that would 
allow the improvement of business culture, an increase in private enterprise, and the 
competition of all businesses, not just those that the government chooses to champion.131 
This process requires the creative destruction of the “old ways” of patronage and 
corruption and the bringing in of incentives for new, innovative ideas that stand for the 
mutual benefit of all the people involved. These changes must then be upheld by a strong 
civil society with access to a free media.  
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Conclusion 
The transition economies have changed immensely since the end of communism 
in the region 28 years ago. As the communism established throughout Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia was a force that connected the ideas of social equality to that of a 
command-controlled economic system, transition economies faced particular challenges 
in establishing themselves with newly formed democratic systems with market-based 
economic systems. This research builds upon previous work that connected democracy 
with high levels of economic performance to see how the transition economies perform 
within the theory. The Economic Complexity Index score as a measure of economic 
performance measures these countries on the basis of a globalizing world in which these 
countries must trade with each other and specialize in particular goods in order to 
succeed. The Democracy Index score uses a broad range of survey questions to study of 
the level of freedom and social democracy in order to dive deeper into the citizen’s life 
and availability of political choices. These two indexes are connected with the idea that 
improvement in democratic, inclusive institutions have the ability to best utilize and 
improve upon the capabilities of people within a country which in turn allows industries 
within the country to best add value and knowledge to goods for trade. Those that exhibit 
authoritarian, or extractive institutions, are unable to distribute power effectively and are 
thus unable to fully access the capabilities and knowledge required to specialize and add 
significant value to goods for trade.  
Based on their own individual histories and the overarching trends of the region, 
the 25 have developed into a diverse mix of economic and political forces, falling into 
three loose groups: those that were able to successfully politically and economically 
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transition to converge with their Western European neighbors; those that developed more 
slowly and are still caught in the gradual stages of mass popular movements and 
sufficient economic performance; and those that are tied to political and economic 
structures of the past, having changed very little in the period of independent transition. 
The case studies discussed here are among these groups.  
Poland has been able to build upon reforms over time that created a virtuous 
cycle. Within this system, democratic institutions are able to feed back into economically 
beneficial and diversifying institutions. Because Poland was one of the most 
economically complex countries at the beginning of the transition and stood as a model of 
democratic reform, the relationship between the development variables is not significant. 
The difference between them just is not enough to constitute a significant relationship. 
This does not mean that the two variables are not related. On the contrary, this supports 
the idea that once a country achieves a high enough level of democracy, such as that of a 
“Flawed Democracy,” that the connection between democracy and economic complexity 
are less vitally connected because they can work and grow independently. Broad-based 
individual power allows citizens to receive and create their own information, create 
private social systems, and make enriching economic choices that are not directly in 
connection to the government. The inclusive institutions Poland’s people and government 
have been able to build together has resulted in a level of democracy that supports a level 
of economic complexity; each, in turn, supports and perpetuates one another, forming a 
virtuous cycle that is able to defend (with recent turbulence) against the non-democratic 
forces of extractive institutions.  
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 Ukraine operates under a similar, but still significantly different, set of 
circumstances. While the development factors are still not significantly related to the 
level of economic complexity, the statistical time analysis of the two variables and the 
qualitative review of factors shows that the political organizational structure does develop 
the economic climate. Additionally, the social movements in the country and the 
subsequent formation of more civil society organizations have increased political 
participation, thus proving indispensable for the creation movement towards a virtuous 
cycle. These social movements, experienced across a select group of transition 
economies, have been critical junctures that have allowed creative destruction to whittle 
away at the extractive structures, such as the massive individual power of the Ukrainian 
president and subsequent oligarchical clan connections. With the continued movement of 
these domestic civil society organizations, in connection with international support, 
Ukraine may be able to continue the democratic movements necessary to allow citizens 
and businesses to make significant economic decisions; this is how economic 
diversification can improve. These democratic movements bolster inclusive institutions 
that more effectively distribute economic power. As seen in the continued elite 
encroachments of power (see Kuchma and Yanukovych) and accompanying mediocre 
economic performance, Ukraine has not yet been able to cement the inclusive institutions 
needed to initiate a fully and truly virtuous cycle that is able, as in Poland, to defend 
against the threat of extractive institutions.  
 Without a substantial model in Central Asia to follow, Kazakhstan’s initiatives to 
transform the country’s power structures and accompanying belief in market capitalism 
must be done independently. Unlike Ukraine, Kazakhstan does not have the European 
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Union to offer, even half-hearted, initiatives or incentives towards European integration. 
Because democracy scores are so low, and there is a more tangible connection between 
the political structure, i.e. Nazarbeyev’s clan of elites, and the industrial sectors, which 
the elites control. Consequently, there is a significant connection between development 
factors and the level of economic complexity in the OLS model. Where democracy and 
economic complexity scores are low enough, there is a significant connection between 
development factors, in conjunction to the time delay effects of a change in a democracy 
with a change in economic complexity, as shown in the ECI/DI section of the Kazakhstan 
case study. Nevertheless, to change these scores, a significant public opinion change and 
consequent popular show of force (as there have been in Ukraine and Poland) are 
required to fundamentally change the strict structures that exist Kazakhstan. These forces 
have perpetuated for decades, and the vicious cycle continues to spin forward as elites 
continue to benefit from oil revenues and further economic inequality. These extractive 
efforts of Nazarbayev's authoritarian regime fully prevent the spread of democratic 
thought necessary to support the spread of power required by true economic diversity. 
 With this research project, I hoped to provide a look into the trends and variation 
that exist in the transition economies as a whole. While the close discussion of these three 
cases cannot exactly provide analysis and prescription for the rest of the transition 
economies, the lessons to be learned from each is the same for the region. States and their 
populations must work together to create and support the institutions necessary to enable 
effective and efficient knowledge collection and transfer. This is at the root of economic 
complexity. Future research might look further into specific political and industrial policy 
recommendations to support economic complexity goals.   
!86 
 
 
 
Works Cited: 
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why nations fail: The origins of power, 
prosperity, and poverty. Crown Books, 2013. 
Anderson, Kym, Giovanni Capannelli, Edimon Ginting, and Kiyoshi Taniguchi, eds. 
Kazakhstan: Uskorenie ekonomichesoi divercifikftsii. Asian Development Bank, 
2018. 
Aslund, Anders. How capitalism was built: the transformation of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Cambridge University Press, 
2013. 
Berend, Tibor Ivan. Central and Eastern Europe, 1944-1993: detour from the periphery 
to the periphery. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Bozhko, Larissa. "Development scenarios for the interregional economic interaction in 
the context of economy clustering in the Republic of Kazakhstan." Energy 
Procedia 147 (2018): 397-401. 
Di Tella, Rafael. “Kazakhstan: Institutions” In Growth and Competitiveness in 
Kazakhstan: Issues and Priorities in the Areas of Macroeconomic, Industrial, 
Trade and Institutional Development Policies, edited by Ricardo Hausmann, 69-
82. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
Economist Intelligence Unit. "Democracy index 2010: Democracy in retreat." Economist 
Intelligence Unit.(http://www. eiu. com/public/democracy_index. aspx), accessed 
January 25 (2010): 2011. 
Fischer, Stanley, and Ratna Sahay. The transition economies after ten years. No. w7664. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000. 
!87 
 
Franke, Anja, Andrea Gawrich, and Gurban Alakbarov. "Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as 
post-Soviet rentier states: resource incomes and autocracy as a double ‘curse’in 
post-Soviet regimes." Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 1 (2009): 109-140. 
Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik. “The Economic Complexity of Transition Economies.” 
Free Network: Policy Brief Series (March 2016): 1-4. 
Gorobets, Alexander. "An independent Ukraine: Sustainable or unsustainable 
development?." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41, no. 1 (2008): 93-
103. 
Hausmann, Ricardo. “Kazakhstan’s Macro Challenges Ahead: A Summary of the 
Views,” In Growth and Competitiveness in Kazakhstan: Issues and Priorities in 
the Areas of Macroeconomic, Industrial, Trade and Institutional Development 
Policies, edited by Ricardo Hausmann, 1-6. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011. 
Hidalgo, César A. and Ricardo Hausmann. “Economic complexity: From useless to 
keystone,” Nature Physics 14, no. 1 (2018): 9-10. 
 Ricardo Hausmann and César A. Hidalgo et al. The Atlas of Economic Complexity: 
Mapping Paths to Prosperity. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2014. 
Grazer, Brian, and Charles Fishman. A Curious Mind: The Secret to a Bigger Life. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2015. 
Hidalgo, César A. "The building blocks of economic complexity." Proceedings of the 
national academy of sciences 106, no. 26 (2009): 10570-10575. 
Junisbai, Azamat K. "The determinants of economic system legitimacy in 
Kazakhstan." Europe-Asia Studies 66, no. 8 (2014): 1234-1252. 
!88 
 
 
Kolodko, Grzegorz W. "A two-thirds of success. Poland's post-communist transformation 
1989–2009." Communist and post-communist studies 42, no. 3 (2009): 325-351. 
———. "Lessons for the emerging markets from Poland's great change." Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 3 (2005): 369-379. 
———. "Socialism, Capitalism, Or Chinism?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 
51, no. 4 (2018). 
Kubicek, Paul. "The European Union and democratization in Ukraine." Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 38, no. 2 (2005): 269-292. 
Levy, Brian. “An institutional analysis of the design and sequence of trade and 
investment policy reform.” The World Bank Economic Review 7 no. 2 (1993): 
247–262. 
Mahdavy, Hossein. “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier 
States: The Case of Iran.” In Studies in Economic History of the Middle East. 
From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day, edited by M.A. Cook. (London: 
School of Oriental and African Studies and Oxford University Press, 1970). 
Meleshchuk, Sergei. “Evoliutsiia ekonomicheskoi clozhnosti Ukrainy: beg na meste.” 
Ekonomicheskaia Pravda. Last modified January 19, 2016.  
Menil, Gerorges de. “Chapter 10. History, Policy, and Performance in Two Transition 
Economies: Poland and Romania.” In In search of prosperity: Analytic narratives 
on economic growth, edited by Dani Rodrik, 271-294. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003. 
!89 
 
Minakov, Mikail and Rojansky, Matthew. “Democracy in Ukraine: Are we there yet?” 
Kennan Cable no. 30 (January 2018): 1-17. 
Observatory of Economic Complexity. MIT Media Lab. (2016) Accessed: April 30, 
2018. https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/ 
Rodrik, Dani. “Notes on an Industrial Strategy for Kazakhstan: The Growth Challenge.” 
In Growth and Competitiveness in Kazakhstan: Issues and Priorities in the Areas 
of Macroeconomic, Industrial, Trade and Institutional Development Policies, 
edited by Ricardo Hausmann, 49-54. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
Pienkos, Donald E. "Review Seeing through the Eyes of the Polish Revolution: Solidarity 
and the Struggle Against Communism in Poland Bloom Jack M. Brill Leiden; 
Boston." The Polish Review 60, no. 2 (2015). 
Prizel, Ilya “Ukraine between Proto-Democracy and ‘Soft’ Authoritarianism,” in Karen 
Dawisha, and Bruce Parrott, eds., Democratic Changes and Authoritarian 
Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1997), 330– 69. 
United Nations. UN Comtrade Database. 2017. Distributed by United Nations Statistics 
Division. http://comtrade.un.org/. 
Van Brabant, Jozef M. Remaking Europe: the European Union and the transition 
economies. Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc, 1999. 
Winiecki, Jan. "Crucial relationship between the privatized sector and the generic private 
sector in post-communist privatization: determinants of economic 
performance." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 33, no. 4 (2000): 505-
515. 
!90 
 
World Bank Group. “BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008 Kazakhstan.” Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey. (January 2010) Accessed March 19, 2018. 
———. “BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008 Poland.” Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey. (January 2010) Accessed March 19, 2018. 
———. “BEEPS At-A-Glance 2008 Ukraine.” Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey. (January 2010) Accessed March 19, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
